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ABSTRACT 
 
In 2013, Medicare launched the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) 
Initiative which linked payments for multiple services for a complete episode of patient care. 
With this innovative reimbursement model, hospitals accepted fixed target payments for certain 
types of clinical diagnoses that were intended to support better care coordination and better 
outcomes for patients at lower cost to Medicare. This was one of many programs aimed at 
addressing the serious challenges facing United States healthcare, including costs that are 
skyrocketing to unsustainable levels and lack of coordination of care across venues. 
Preliminary Medicare results showed that bundled payments might lead to lower costs 
and higher quality of care, however, this idea comes from a relatively small sample size and 
limited run time of the program. This study examined one large community hospital in the 
southeast part of the United States participating in the BPCI Initiative. Patient level data was 
retrospectively analyzed using statistical techniques to determine if financial, operational and 
clinical outcomes improved as result of the BPCI program compared to similar patient data 
before the program. 
The results were mixed. Financial outcomes did not change significantly, and remained 
higher than the CMS targets. Length of stay decreased significantly, as anticipated. The 30-day 
readmissions was statistically unchanged. This study illuminated both challenges and strategies 
in implementing bundled payments to achieve positive financial, operational, and clinical 
outcomes. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction 
The American healthcare delivery system is unlike almost any other in the world, and it is 
in a period of massive transformation. This is driven by steep technological innovation in the 
healthcare industry, economic pressure to reduce costs, increasing government focus on reform, 
and the consumerization of healthcare bringing social demand for choices and information 
transparency. The United States health system is a kaleidoscope of public and private financing, 
insurance, delivery, and payment mechanisms that are only loosely coordinated and with little 
standardization (Shi & Singh, 2015). And although it does deliver some remarkable results in 
clinical research, screening, and treatment (cancer and heart diseases, for examples) (NCHS, 
2016a), it fails on two broad and important points: controlled costs and consistently high quality. 
Healthcare Cost 
Healthcare costs are on a soaring trajectory that is not sustainable. America spends more 
per capita on healthcare than any other industrialized nation, topping $9,990 per person per year. 
Refer to Figure 1 below. In 2015, national health expenditures grew by 5.8 percent totaling $3.2 
trillion and accounted for 17.8 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It is projected to 
continue to grow at an average rate of 5.6 percent from 2016 through 2025, reaching over $5 
trillion annually. Despite some years of decelerated growth, this level of growth is still faster 
than that of the projected GDP, which means that healthcare expenditures will reach one-fifth of 
 2 
the economy in the next ten years, according to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS, 2016b). Refer to Figure 2 below. And, furthermore, a disproportionate amount of the 
growth will be attributed to federal Medicare spending. This is a reflection of the rise in use of 
Medicare services and more baby boomers reaching the age of Medicare entitlement. 
 
Figure 1. U.S. healthcare costs per capita compared to other countries. (Source: PGPF, 2017) 
 
 
Figure 2. National health expenditures as percentage of GDP. (Source: PGPF, 2017) 
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Healthcare Quality 
In addition to soaring costs, the American healthcare system also does not provide equal 
access, consistent quality, or coordinated and safe care to all Americans. Despite spending more 
per capita on healthcare services than any other developed country, life expectancy is not among 
the highest and health outcomes are, in many cases, no better and often worse (OECD, 2015). 
This is illustrated in the Figures 3 and 4 below. 
 
Figure 3. U.S. healthcare quality outcomes compared to other countries. (Source: PGPF, 2017) 
 
Figure 4. U.S. life expectancy compared to other countries. (Source: PGPF, 2017) 
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Problem Statement  
The federal government analyzed, over many years, a broad range of approaches to solve 
the dual-pronged healthcare problem: how to greatly reduce the costs of the healthcare industry 
while also improving the quality of healthcare delivery. One of those approaches was to pay 
Medicare providers for bundles of services instead of the traditional individual payments for 
each service. A single payment would be made for all services and providers related to a 
particular disease or treatment over a defined period of time, with the expectation that the total 
payment would be less than under the current system. This approach would necessarily 
encourage care coordination for greater efficiency among the providers, with the expectation that 
quality and outcomes would improve. 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated the savings for bundling of certain 
types of episodes of care to be $34 billion for the period 2017 to 2026. And while preliminary 
results show that bundled payments might, indeed, lead to lower costs and higher quality of care, 
this impression comes from a relatively small sample size and limited run time of the program. 
There are also risks, such as cost-shifting, with these programs that have not been fully explored. 
This study, therefore, attempted to close some of these gaps in knowledge by investigating the 
efficacy of one of the bundled payment programs implemented in a hospital in the southeast part 
of the United States. 
Background 
There are a myriad of forces putting pressure on the healthcare industry, beginning 
fundamentally with a population that is both growing in numbers and aging. The older 
population uses more healthcare services and therefore, more money is spent per capita. Refer to 
Figures 5 and 6 below. Certainly, a principal goal of U.S. healthcare policy is to reduce injuries, 
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diseases, and disabilities, yielding healthier people who live longer, according to the National 
Center for Health Statistics (NCHS, 2016c). The NCHS program Healthy People 2020 is a ten 
year agenda to improve the health of all people in the United States (NCHS, 2016b). The more 
successful our policies are, the more population aging we will encounter. 
 
Figure 5. U.S. growth of elderly population. (Source: PGPF, 2017) 
 
 
Figure 6. Medical spending increases by age. (Source: PGPF, 2017) 
 
 6 
There are many other factors besides the changing demographics driving the need for 
reform in the American healthcare delivery system. Following is a partial list of the forces of 
change, according to Shi and Singh (2015). 
• Social: unhealthy lifestyles to include alcohol and drug abuse, smoking, obesity, 
sedentary lifestyles, and poor nutrition; non-compliance with medication and 
physician recommendations 
• Economic: rising hospital costs, national debt and budget shortfalls, disparities in 
access to care providers based on geography and socio-economics, a significant 
increase in Americans with health insurance seeking care 
• Political: divided country on healthcare policy issues, uncertainty about ACA and 
legislative changes 
• Technological: disruptive technologies providing new health tools and information 
for providers as well as consumers 
• Ecological: new diseases, natural disasters, bio-terrorism, an increase in chronic 
diseases and acute conditions 
• Global: medical tourism, overseas drug manufacturing leading to safety and supply 
issues, telemedicine, provider migration 
• Anthro-cultural: changing beliefs, values and traditions related to healthcare, the rise 
of health industry consumerism 
• Practice: inconsistent quality of care and outcomes, healthcare infrastructure 
limitations, defensive medicine with unnecessary or duplicative tests 
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Government Reform 
The healthcare landscape is increasingly volatile, complex and ambiguous, but one thing 
is clear and certain: change is underway in this industry, led in part by the federal government. 
While there was early research and work on healthcare reform in America that suggested various 
models and methods for change, these were only sparsely implemented until the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) laws were enacted in 2009 and 2010, respectively. However, there has been steady and 
continual discussion about the topic, particularly in government forums, for the past three 
decades. Bill Clinton focused his 1992 U.S. presidential campaign on healthcare issues, and upon 
his election, he quickly formed a task force on healthcare reform headed by then-First Lady 
Hillary Rodham Clinton. The proposed reform package, known as the Health Security Act, along 
with several revisions and competing proposals, met with opposition and was ultimately 
defeated. The 2004 and 2008 presidential elections featured healthcare proposals by both major 
political parties, and the topic was discussed and debated by the democratic and republican 
candidates. However, significant reform would be elusive until the successful enactment of 
ARRA and ACA, notwithstanding the wide opposition across the country. Today, the debate at 
the highest government levels continues, and the fate of current healthcare policy and legislation 
remains unclear. However, the march toward value-based reimbursement models continues on a 
gradual pace forward. 
ACA Law 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), signed into law on March 23, 
2010, is levying substantial impact on the U.S. healthcare system. Together with the Health Care 
and Education Reconciliation Act amendment passed into law seven days later, ACA represents 
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the most significant revamp of the U.S. healthcare system since the 1965 enactment of Medicare 
to provide health insurance to people aged 65 and older, regardless of income or medical history, 
and Medicaid for individuals with limited resources. Under ACA, hospitals and physicians were 
to transform their practices financially, technologically, and clinically to drive better health 
outcomes, lower costs, and improve their methods of distribution and accessibility (GPO, 2010). 
Refer to Appendix A for a high-level summary of the ACA, which in its original form was over 
900 pages, and now includes thousands more pages of clarification language. 
One section of ACA: Title III - Improving the Quality and Efficiency of Health Care, 
prescribes an overhaul of the Medicare reimbursement system. It directs the CMS, under its 
newly formed Innovation Center, to design and implement pioneering payment and service 
delivery models to reduce costs while at the same time maintaining or improving quality of care. 
Traditional Medicare models involving fees paid for each service performed has often resulted in 
fragmented care, lacking coordination among providers and healthcare venues. It also rewards 
the quantity of services offered by providers rather than the quality of care and outcomes. 
BPCI Initiative 
One specific ACA directive was for a five-year pilot program on payment bundling to 
begin in 2013. The program, which runs through 2018, provides a bulk fixed payment for an 
episode of care to be shared by a hospital, physician group, skilled nursing facility and home 
health agency rather than the traditional fee-for-service paid for every line item of service from 
the various healthcare providers. The episode of care includes the inpatient hospital services, 
physician services, outpatient hospital services, and post-acute care services for the period of 
time beginning three days prior to a hospitalization and spanning 30-90 days following 
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discharge. This is illustrated in Figure 7 below. This innovative reimbursement model is intended 
to support better care coordination and better outcomes for patients at lower cost to Medicare. 
 
Figure 7. Illustration of bundled payments as the sum of many healthcare costs. 
In 2012, CMS announced the launch of this pilot program, naming it the Bundled 
Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) Initiative. BPCI has four broadly defined models of 
care, which link payments for multiple services that patients receive during a defined episode of 
care. Under this program, healthcare organizations contract for special reimbursement 
arrangements that include financial and performance accountability for entire episodes of care. 
Over 1500 healthcare provider organizations are participating in or have participated in 
one or more of the four models and 48 clinical conditions defined in the BPCI program. The first 
cohort began April 1, 2013, and the BPCI program is scheduled to conclude by September 30, 
2018. The four models vary by the types of participants (hospitals, physician groups, and post-
acute care providers), patient diagnoses (from a list such as diabetes, sepsis, and stroke), services 
included in the bundle (hospital, post-acute, and readmissions) and method of payment 
(prospective and retrospective). Refer to Appendix B for a summary of the BPCI program. The 
aim of BPCI is to increase coordination among healthcare providers since only a single, 
discounted payment is made by Medicare to the physicians, hospitals, and post-acute care 
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providers involved in delivering an episode of care during a specific time period. Because a 
bundled payment is typically smaller than the sum of the individual payments, success depends 
on reducing costs and increasing efficiency while still providing quality care. 
Preliminary results, according to The Lewin Group, who are contracted by CMS to 
provide annual evaluation and monitoring reports, show on average that bundled payments lead 
to lower costs and higher quality of care (Lewin, 2016). Despite the relatively small sample size 
and limited run time of the program, which The Lewin Group is cautionary about, Medicare 
continues to rapidly expand the bundled payments model. CMS launched a new mandatory 
participation program for over 800 hospitals called Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement 
(CJR) – a bundled payment model that started on April 1, 2016, and CMS also established a set 
of cardiac episode payment models (EPM) that were to have started in July 2017. However, this 
program was beset with delays and a proposal to cancel it, so its fate is unknown at the time of 
this writing. That begs the questions: are the early positive results representative and 
generalizable across time and across all kinds of hospitals and/or are there important success 
factors that must be present? 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this research was to study the efficacy of the Medicare Bundled Payments 
for Care Improvement Initiative at a large community hospital in the southeastern part of the 
United States. BPCI is a relatively new care and payment model that started in 2013 with as yet 
low participation and not enough empirical data available to determine the value of the program. 
There are also many variations in the timeframe that participants have been in the program, 
organizational profiles, selected clinical groups and episodes, the BPCI model, program waivers, 
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design choices, and exclusions. This makes it challenging to draw definitive conclusions as to the 
impact of the BPCI Initiative on financial, operational and clinical outcomes. 
Significance of the Study 
The quantitative and qualitative analysis from this study extends the body of knowledge 
about the efficacy of alternative payment models that challenge the traditional fee-for-service 
paradigm in the healthcare industry. This could help improve care through economic incentives 
that lower costs while maintaining or improving quality of care. There are a plethora of studies 
and publications that provide evidence of some of the significant challenges facing healthcare: 
1.) skyrocketing costs of healthcare in America coupled with an aging population and an increase 
in chronic and acute health conditions; 2.) lack of coordination of care across venues and among 
providers, and highly variable outcomes; 3.) lack of patient activation and engagement in their 
care management, exacerbated by a lack of information transparency about cost and quality; 4.) 
lack of optimized and standardized care pathways and support systems (staffing, technology, 
analytics); and 5.) lack of alignment in goals, objectives and economics between providers, 
payors, and employers. 
However, there are also gaps in the literature which makes this type of research 
important. First, there are not enough current and past participants in the BPCI program yet to 
determine the true efficacy, as measured by financial, operational and clinical outcomes; or to 
generalize the results across the industry. This study adds to the evidence either supporting or not 
supporting those findings and may be generalizable to a certain similar segment of the healthcare 
provider industry. Second, there are no defined standards for bundled payment program 
implementations. Lessons learned from this organization’s experiences may lead to the 
development of a model that depicts at least some of the factors that are important in the 
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implementation of a bundled payment initiative, as well as the characteristics of the environment 
that may impact the success of the program. 
For instance, other empirical studies on bundled payment programs indicated that there 
were several key factors in their implementations that impacted the results. A bundled payments 
model of implementation success factors and lessons learned may involve elements such as the 
following list: proactive preparation, administrative funding for the new program, patient 
education, physician training, care pathways redesign, relationships with post-acute care 
facilities, patient demographics and acuity, hospital capabilities, marketing, communications, 
leadership oversight, engaged staff, hospital facilities, patient engagement, information 
technology, gainsharing model, use of consultants for data analysis, collaboration with 
physicians, ability to leverage data and analytics to develop higher performing and dynamic care 
pathways and teams, beneficiary incentives, discharge planning, case management, care 
coordination, use of telehealth and home visits, and follow up appointments. 
It is hardly fathomable that an alternative payment model that rewards hospitals that work 
together with physicians and other providers to avoid complications, prevent hospital 
readmissions, speed recovery and result in lower cost and better outcomes could possibly be 
hiding any downside, so this research study might be interesting at the least. 
This research study might also set a foundation for future research in this focus area. For 
instance, research could be done for bundled payment results for other clinical episodes, for 
acute care bundles versus chronic care bundles, for different organization types (profit versus 
non-profit, single hospitals versus multi-hospital systems, accountable care organizations (ACO), 
physician groups versus hospitals, systems with ownership in multiple venues of care), for 
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different patient demographics and acuity, and for additional payors such as commercial 
insurance companies. 
Research Questions 
This study sought to answer four specific research questions: 
RQ1 (financial): What is the relationship between a hospital’s participation in a Medicare 
bundled payment initiative and the cost of care for patients with lower extremity joint 
replacements? 
RQ2 (operational): What is the relationship between a hospital’s participation in a 
Medicare bundled payment initiative and the utilization of hospital services (length of stay) for 
patients with lower extremity joint replacements? 
RQ3 (clinical): What is the relationship between a hospital’s participation in a Medicare 
bundled payment initiative and quality of care (readmissions) for patients with lower extremity 
joint replacements? 
RQ4 (descriptive): What factors or characteristics shape a hospital’s participation in a 
Medicare bundled payment initiative for patients with lower extremity joint replacements? 
To answer the first three research questions which are quantitative in nature, the unit of 
analysis was patient-level encounter and claims data over a period of time. The fourth research 
question is qualitative in nature and describes the organization’s BPCI program design. 
Therefore, the unit of analysis for RQ4 was the hospital being studied. 
Research Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses formed the basis for this research and are derived from the four 
research questions defined earlier. 
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H1 (financial): A hospital’s participation in BPCI Model 2 for Medicare patients with 
lower extremity joint replacements leads to better financial outcomes as measured by the hospital 
charges for the care. 
H2 (operational): A hospital’s participation in BPCI Model 2 for Medicare patients with 
lower extremity joint replacements leads to better operational outcomes as measured by hospital 
length of stay. 
H3 (clinical): A hospital’s participation in BPCI Model 2 for Medicare patients with 
lower extremity joint replacements leads to better clinical outcomes as measured by hospital 
readmissions within 30 days.  
H4 (descriptive): A hospital’s participation in BPCI Model 2 for Medicare patients with 
lower extremity joint replacements can be characterized by a set of factors that define the 
program and lead to success. 
Research Design 
This study examined the results at one large community hospital in the southeast 
participating in Model 2 of the BPCI Initiative since July 1, 2015 for major joint replacement 
patients (lower extremity – hips and knees). Patient level data was retrospectively analyzed using 
descriptive and inferential statistics to determine if financial, operational and clinical outcomes 
improved as result of the BPCI program as compared to similar patient data before the program. 
This study contributes to academic and industry business knowledge by statistically describing 
empirical BPCI results at a specific type of hospital, presenting a model of BPCI implementation 
success factors and lessons learned, and setting the stage for future research in this field of study 
that could substantially impact the cost curve for this country’s healthcare. 
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Study Site 
The focus of this study was one large acute care community hospital located in the 
southeast part of the United States. This hospital was chosen for this study in part because it is 
significant in size, scope of practice, operational and financial status, leadership and clinical 
expertise, resources available, and motivation to execute the BPCI program. The name was 
anonymized in this manuscript as a personal choice by the author. It was not requested by the 
organization and was only done out of an abundance of caution. The BPCI program 
implementation blueprint and the results may contain information that the organization would 
not wish to share so openly, and which might possibly impact their competitive advantage in the 
industry. While the identity of the organization was likely discernable from various facts 
presented here, it will still be referred to anonymously in this study. 
At the time of this study, the hospital was a very large not-for-profit, multi-specialty 
institution that had a vibrant emergency department, a busy surgery practice, and many other 
clinical offerings. It had been passionately serving its community for over a century with a range 
of average to excellent scores on most industry standard measures of clinical, operational and 
financial performance. This hospital was the only one in the area that served a community with 
economic, demographic and health disparities as compared to the others in the region and the 
nation. Senior adults (ages 65 and above) represented a considerable portion of the community 
with distinctive healthcare needs, 37% of the population were minorities, 19% had a primary 
language other than English, 18% did not complete high school, and there were higher than 
average poverty rates. Many health conditions, comorbidities and outcomes were comparatively 
worse than the region and the nation, including heart diseases, hypertension, respiratory diseases, 
cancer, diabetes, obesity, substance abuse, and infectious diseases. This was described in the 
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hospital’s publicly-available 2014-2017 Community Health Needs Assessment. These points 
were salient because the characteristics of the focus hospital and its patient population may have 
had significant impact on the results of the BPCI program. 
The relationships that the hospital had with other venues of care and community 
physician practice groups were also noteworthy. The hospital did not own or operate any post-
acute care facilities, and did not directly employ most of the physicians practicing in the hospital. 
These were important facts because the BPCI program called for financial, operational and 
clinical improvements achieved thru collaborative working relationships with providers across 
the spectrum of the episode. 
In early 2015, the hospital entered into an agreement with CMS to voluntarily participate 
in the BPCI Model 2 Initiative for Medicare patients with major joint replacements of the lower 
extremity (LEJR). LEJR patients were those who had hip or knee replacement surgery in a 
hospital. The hospital agreed to accept a target price from CMS for each LEJR episode based on 
a previous three years of historical costs (FY2010-FY2012) incurred for the hospital patients, 
with a three percent discount applied. Model 2 included both the acute hospital care and the post-
acute care. Therefore, the hospital also agreed to partner with community physicians and post-
acute care providers, and offered a 50 percent gainsharing plan with the participating physicians, 
while the hospital accepted all of the risk. The program began on July 1, 2015 and was 
contractually planned for a three-year period ending June 30, 2018. Because Model 2 used a 
retrospective payment system, there was a lag in compiling data, so this particular research study 
only covered an 18-month BPCI period starting July 1, 2015 and ending December 31, 2016. 
The hospital chose to participate in the voluntary BPCI initiative for several reasons. 
First, it was seen as an opportunity to learn how to design, manage and measure results for a new 
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payment model before it became mandatory, and with a predictable and acceptable level of risk. 
Second, it provided a methodology to improve quality of care and reduce costs which could then 
be shared with participating physicians. Third, it was an opportunity to engage and collaborate 
with patients, physicians and post-acute care providers in the community. In summary, the 
hospital BPCI key program parameters estimated at the time of program initiation (July 1, 2015) 
were: 
• Model 2 LEJR; physician gainsharing, hospital risk-bearing, 30-day post-acute period 
• Agreement to redesign LEJR care pathways, engage patients and coordinate care 
• Approximately 30 qualified LEJR patients per month (Medicare) 
• 10-12 orthopedic surgeons performing LEJR procedures (4-5 hospital employees, 6-7 
physicians contracted from another community practice group) 
• Approximately 30 post-acute care providers (20 skilled nursing facilities, 10 home health 
agencies) 
Definition of Terms 
The following healthcare industry concepts, terms related to the BPCI Initiative Model 2, 
and measurement variables in this study are defined below. Industry acronyms and terms are also 
summarized in Appendix C and Appendix D. 
Medicare Program Terminology 
Medicare is a federal health insurance program for the elderly (people 65 years of age or 
older), certain individuals with disabilities, and people with End Stage Renal Disease. It is an 
entitlement program that differs from Medicaid, which is a federal and state welfare program for 
the poor. In addition to these federal programs, there are also commercial and private insurance 
programs. Medicare has four parts (A, B, C and D) that cover different services. 
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Medicare Part A is hospital insurance that covers inpatient hospital stays, care in a skilled 
nursing facility, hospice care, and some home healthcare. 
Medicare Part B is medical insurance that covers certain doctors' services, outpatient 
care, medical supplies, and preventive services. 
Medicare Part C is a group of plans known as Medicare Advantage that are offered by 
private companies contracted with Medicare to provide Part A and Part B benefits. 
Medicare Part D is prescription drug coverage offered by insurance companies and other 
private companies approved by Medicare. 
Hospital Payment Terminology 
Fee for Service is the traditional way for hospitals and providers to be paid for care 
rendered where each service is charged separately and payment is received for each service. 
Pay for Performance is a more contemporary hospital and provider payment system that 
links payment to quality and efficiency as an incentive to improve care and decrease costs. 
Retrospective Payment System is a system where the payment for a specific service is 
based on actual costs incurred. 
Prospective Payment System is a system where the payment for a specific service is 
predetermined and not based on actual costs incurred. 
Cost is the actual amount that the hospital or provider actually incurs to provide a service. 
Charge is the amount that the hospital or provider bills the insurance payor for a service 
and this may not be equal to the cost of the service. 
Reimbursement is the amount an insurance payor, such as Medicare, actually pays the 
hospital or provider for a service and it may not be the same as the costs incurred or the charges 
billed. 
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BPCI Terminology 
Bundled Payment is a predetermined target price for all of the items and services 
provided for the episode of care. A retrospective reconciliation compares this target price to the 
total fee for service payments made by CMS to the providers. If the total fee for service 
payments is less than the target price, the hospital receives the difference from CMS. If the total 
fee for service payments exceeds the target price, the hospital must pay the difference to CMS. 
Beneficiary is a patient scheduled or admitted for the applicable clinical episode (LEJR in 
this study) who is eligible for Medicare Part A and enrolled in Part B, does not have End Stage 
Renal Disease and is not enrolled in any managed care plan. 
Episode of Care includes the pre-admission test, patient’s hospital care, post-acute care, 
and all related services which ends 30 days after initial hospital discharge. 
Post-Acute Care includes services from providers of care from the date of hospital 
discharge until 30 days after. This includes skilled nursing facilities, home health, inpatient and 
outpatient rehabilitation and follow-up services, hospital readmissions, and emergency care 
visits. 
Study Variables 
Financial outcomes are assessed as the total cost of an episode of care and measured in 
two components: hospital care cost and post-acute care cost. Financial outcomes are considered 
better if the total cost of an episode of care during the BPCI program is less than that of a similar 
episode of care not in the BPCI program. 
Operational outcomes are assessed as the utilization of services during an episode of care 
and measured in two components: patient length of stay in the hospital and patient length of stay 
in a post-acute care facility. Operational outcomes are considered better if the utilization of an 
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episode of care during the BPCI program is less than that of a similar episode of care not in the 
BPCI program. 
Clinical outcomes are assessed as the quality of care during an episode of care and 
measured in two components: readmissions to the hospital and visits to the emergency 
department during the 30 days following the initial hospital discharge. Clinical outcomes are 
considered better if the 30-day readmissions of an episode of care during the BPCI program is 
less than that of a similar episode of care not in the BPCI program. 
Assumptions and Limitations 
This study was primarily quantitative and the author accepted the philosophical 
assumptions of positivism. The research method selected, retrospective data analysis, was 
assumed to be the best approach to answer the research questions. Furthermore, the study results 
might be generalizable through statistical probability, although the quantitative analysis scope 
was limited to a single hospital, one year of program participation, and a relatively small sample 
out of a much larger population of data. It was assumed that the sample was representative of the 
population and that the bundled payment reimbursement model would continue to be important 
in the healthcare industry for some time. The study was intentionally delimited by investigating 
only certain factors that may have impacted the results, such as hospital costs, length of stay and 
readmissions. It was not feasible to consider other factors, such as patient, surgeon and post-
acute facility profiles as well as longitudinal program changes, due to data availability and 
research time allotted. 
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Organization of Dissertation 
This research manuscript is organized as a traditional dissertation with five main 
chapters: Introduction, Literature Review, Methods, Results, Discussion and Conclusions, 
followed by supporting reference material. 
Chapter One (this chapter) introduced the research problem and background, described 
the purpose and significance of the study, listed the research questions and hypotheses, and 
summarized the research design and study site. It concluded with definitions of relevant 
terminology, and a brief discussion of the study assumptions and limitations. 
Chapter Two is a Literature Review that contains the search description, conceptual or 
theoretical framework, and a review of current and prior research on the topic. 
Chapter Three is the Methods section that contains the research design, research 
questions and hypotheses, the study setting, participants, population and sample, data collection 
method and data analysis techniques. 
Chapter Four is the Results section that contains the findings from the statistical analysis, 
organized by the research hypotheses. 
Chapter Five is the Discussion and Conclusions section that contains a summary of 
findings, conclusions about the hypotheses, a discussion about the research, suggestions for 
future research and a brief conclusion. 
Following the five main chapters are a list of references cited in this manuscript, several 
appendices with supporting information including statistical output and other reference material, 
and a short author biography. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents literature on the topic of bundled payments that served as the 
foundation for this study. It begins with a description of the literature search and selection 
process. This is followed by a brief historical review of the Medicare program from its inception 
in the 1960s to the present, hospital economics, and alternative payment models. The next 
section delves into the BPCI program, its design and objectives, program elements that are 
discussed in studies of actual implementations, and a short discussion on the gainsharing and 
risk-bearing aspects of healthcare payment systems. Finally, a summary of BPCI results to date 
are presented, including those from a series of published empirical studies on value-based 
reimbursement systems and recent studies on BPCI implementations. It concludes with a 
discussion on the many open challenges with bundled payments, and a summary of the 
contributions and gaps found in the literature. 
Search Strategy and Methods 
An extensive search was conducted for each sub-topic included in this literature review 
chapter using the University of South Florida online library search tools and databases. Google 
Scholar, U.S. Government sites such as the Department of Health and Human Services and the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and healthcare industry journals such as The 
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Journal of Arthroplasty were also used. Finally, a review of the reference lists from several key 
studies and articles also yielded new leads. 
Search terms were specific to each sub-topic and included combinations of words and 
phrases, including: healthcare, hospital, physician, payment, reimbursement, cost, quality, 
finance, Medicare, value-based, fee for service, pay for performance, alternative payment model, 
bundled payment, BPCI, length of stay, readmissions, outcome, care redesign, gainsharing, risk 
bearing, and financial risk. 
This search strategy yielded a large amount of literature, and therefore, screening and 
scoring methods were employed to narrow the volume. A manual review of the title, abstract, 
keywords, and sometimes full text successfully screened out a good portion of the results. A 
scoring system was applied to the remaining material that gave higher weight to publications in 
peer-reviewed journals, studies that used quantitative and statistical analysis methods, articles 
published in the recent five to ten years, authors and journals that are well-known and respected 
in the healthcare industry, and some case studies that discussed empirical experiences with 
bundled payments. 
Brief History 
Medicare Program 
Medicare was created in 1965 as an amendment to the Social Security Act to provide 
publicly financed health insurance to the elderly at a time when older Americans found it 
virtually impossible to get private health insurance coverage. This made access to healthcare an 
entitlement for Americans aged 65 and older. It was implemented in two components: Part A 
which paid for hospital and nursing home service, and Part B which paid for physician and 
outpatient services. Nineteen million Americans enrolled in the program when services began on 
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July 1, 1966 (Shi & Singh, 2015). This triggered a meteoric growth in access and therefore, 
demand for healthcare services. As explained by economic theory and moral hazards, broader 
health insurance lowered consumer out-of-pocket costs, leading to higher utilization of 
healthcare services. This contributed to explosive inflation of healthcare spending and the 
Medicare financing problems that began soon after it was formed. National health expenditures 
began to increase sharply, jumping 78% in the first five years and another 71% in the next five 
years (Shi & Singh, 2015). For over 40 years now, policy makers have worked to develop 
creative solutions to curb this growth. Today more than 57 million Americans depend on 
Medicare for their health insurance at a cost of over $600 billion annually. See Figure 8 below. 
 
Figure 8. U.S. government spending on healthcare. (Source: PGPF, 2017) 
Healthcare Economics 
The healthcare finance structure is enormously complex compared to single-payor 
systems of countries like Canada and Great Britain. In America, both public and private payors 
play significant roles and numerous reimbursement methods exist, including retrospective and 
prospective reimbursement systems, cost-plus, fee for service, pay for performance, value-based 
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models, and bundled payments (package pricing) – applied to hospitals (Part A) and/or 
physicians (Part B) (Shi & Singh, 2015). 
Medicare began with a cost-plus method for hospital (Part A) reimbursement, which used 
a formula to calculate a per-patient-day rate based on hospital costs plus an overhead amount. 
This was a retrospective reimbursement model because it was calculated by evaluating costs 
after the services were performed. Under this system, reimbursement was directly related to 
length of stay, services provided and the cost of those services. There was no incentive to contain 
costs or become more efficient. In fact, there were incentives to provide more services than 
necessary to increase profits (James & Poulsen, 2016). Because of this paradox built into the 
retrospective cost-plus model, Medicare largely abandoned it for hospital reimbursements in 
1983 and adopted a prospective system. 
In contrast to retrospective, the prospective system uses criteria to determine the 
reimbursement before the services are delivered, typically based on diagnosis-related groups 
(DRG). A DRG groups together principal diagnoses that are expected to require similar hospital 
resources. This decreases spending by curbing over-utilization abuses and allows Medicare to 
better predict healthcare spending. It also incentivizes hospitals to reduce costs so it could 
increase profits for itself.  
Fee for service is one of the oldest reimbursement methods and it is still used today for 
physician services (Part B) and some outpatient hospital services. Each unit of service is 
separately itemized on one or more bills. Much like cost-plus and other retrospective systems, 
some policy makers suggested that the fee for service payment model incentivized hospitals and 
physicians to increase their income by increasing the volume of patients and number of services 
without regard for the necessity or appropriateness of those services (James & Poulsen, 2016). 
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Conversely, bundled fees include a number of services in one price. This type of package 
pricing reduces the incentive to provide non-essential services. More recently, the ACA directed 
Medicare to develop “value-based purchasing” methods that incorporate pay for performance. 
The goal is to reduce reimbursement while improving quality and efficiency. Most organizations 
are required to report quality data to the CMS, or face penalties. Pay for performance links 
reimbursement to these quality and efficiency measures as an incentive to improve them (Shi & 
Singh 2015). 
Medicare trust funds have been, for many years, running in a deficit mode and on a 
trajectory toward insolvency. In addition, healthcare expenditures have continued to shift from 
the private to the public sector. This trend is accelerating as shown in Figure 9 below. 
 
Figure 9. Private and government share of healthcare spending trend. (Source: PGPF, 2017) 
Nearly since the inception of Medicare, policy makers were already concerned with the 
uncontrolled growth in costs and were proposing innovate ways to curb it. Research has shown 
that bundled payments can align incentives for providers, including hospitals, post-acute care 
providers, physicians, and other practitioners, allowing them to work closely together across all 
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specialties and settings. The theory posits that care from providers who collaborate to deliver 
services to a patient though the entire episode of care will be well-coordinated and result in 
improved quality (CMS, 2013). 
Alternative Payment Models 
The idea of bundled payments is not new to the healthcare industry, with examples 
documented more than 30 years ago. In fact, when Medicare adopted the prospective payment 
system in 1983, it effectively shifted the cost risks of providing care onto hospitals. Although not 
officially termed bundled payments since it did not cover entire episodes of care, this system 
created a set or fixed fee schedule for specific diagnoses. Unfortunately, this was applied only to 
hospitals and not to physicians, who continued to be paid as fee for service, and therefore 
behaviors did not change. Much work was done in this area to improve cost efficiency among 
physicians including instituting a “usual and customary charges” approach and later a “relative 
value scale” (Andrawis et al., 2016). 
One of the first attempts at implementing bundled payments was in 1984 at The Texas 
Heart Institute. There, cardiovascular surgeries were offered in a single package price, which was 
lower than the average Medicare payment. This was deemed a success, as the plan lowered costs, 
while still maintaining high quality and outcomes. The first bundled payment in orthopedics 
occurred in 1987 at a Michigan hospital where a surgeon offered a 2-year warranty for knee 
arthroscopy. Again, this was considered a success as it reduced costs (Andrawis et al., 2016; 
Anoushiravani & Iorio, 2016; Froimson et al., 2014). 
In 1991, the Health Care Financing Administration (now known as CMS) believed that as 
long as physicians operated under a different payment system from hospitals, they would 
continue to be incentivized to use more services and not less. So, they launched the Medicare 
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Participating Heart Bypass Center Demonstration, a five-year pilot with three hospitals to pay a 
flat fee for all inpatient as well as physician services for two DRGs. The cost savings were 
significant however, the providers were not satisfied with the administration of the program and 
it was never extended (Anoushiravani & Iorio, 2016). 
Several other experimental models emerged over the next decade with mixed results. A 
2008 report to Congress by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission discussed that 
hospitals and physicians should be financially motivated to coordinate care, limit services and 
improve cost efficiency (MedPac, 2008). Shortly thereafter, the Acute Care Episode (ACE) 
demonstration program was launched for some cardiovascular and orthopedic services. Though 
small in scope, all participating hospitals reduced the overall episode costs by 10-15% 
(Anoushiravani & Iorio, 2016). 
Despite the examples of success, bundled payments never became mainstream until it 
was required by law with ACA. The 2010 passage of the ACA brought with it the creation of the 
Innovation Center under the CMS (CMMI) to develop and administer innovative healthcare 
payment and service delivery models. It has a growing portfolio of pilot projects that, according 
to the CMMI website (https://innovation.cms.gov/), “aim to achieve better care for patients, 
smarter spending and healthier communities”. Currently, 30 percent of Medicare payments flow 
through alternative payment models including episode-based payment initiatives (such as BPCI 
and CJR) or Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs). CMS has indicated it intends to raise that 
level to over 50 percent by 2018 (CMS, 2016a). Refer to Figure 10 below. 
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Figure 10. Brief history of bundled payments in healthcare. 
BPCI Program Description 
Design and Objectives 
Bundled Payments for Care Improvement was designed initially to be a three-year 
voluntary national program with a two-year extension option. Its two main objectives were to 
implement an alternative payment model that would 1.) improve patient care, and 2.) lower costs 
to Medicare. And importantly, under this program, the problem resulting from fee for service 
reimbursement would be addressed: fragmented care with minimal coordination across providers 
and healthcare settings (CMS, 2016a). The focus is on outcomes for an episode of care, rather 
than separate services in care delivery. Providers are rewarded for increasing quality and 
reducing costs, and penalized if costs exceed a set amount. The financial risk under BPCI shifted 
to the care providers. The hospital (in most cases) is compensated for the entire episode of care 
(from 3 days prior to hospitalization to 90 days post discharge) at a rate discounted 2-3% from 
historical levels (the target price). If the total cost of care for the episode exceeds the target price, 
the hospital is responsible for the difference. If the total cost is less than the target, the savings 
can be shared among the providers. 
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Because the program was voluntary and intended to attract much broader participation 
than previous demonstration initiatives, it was designed with four models of bundled payments 
tied to an inpatient hospital admission. The models varied by the types of providers involved 
(hospitals, physicians, post-acute care providers), types of procedures (48 diagnoses to choose 
from), method of payment and reconciliation (retrospective, fee for service, prospective) and the 
episode length of time after the hospitalization (30, 60 or 90 days). Of the four, Model 2 emerged 
as the most widely adopted, accounting for more than three quarters of the episodes and almost 
half of the provider participants, possibly because there is no downside risk for physicians – only 
for hospitals (Lewin, 2016). This model was also favored because of the retrospective payment 
aspect with after-the-fact reconciliation. 
Orthopedic Focus 
Much like some of the early bundled payment demonstration projects from the 1980s 
forward, the orthopedic procedures were widely selected in the BPCI initiative. During the first 
year of the program, 74 percent of the Model 2 episodes were for major joint replacements of the 
lower extremity – the focus of this study (Lewin, 2016). Some of the reasons cited for this 
tendency are that orthopedic procedures are elective in most cases; they are among the most 
commonly performed surgeries; they are significantly expensive; and they depend heavily on 
post- acute care services. In addition, these procedures use implantable devices and surgical 
supplies, making them natural targets for standardization, vendor price negotiation, and overall 
cost savings initiatives. Refer to the Figure 11 below for illustration. 
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Figure 11. Illustration of lower extremity joint replacement costs. (Source: Caradigm, 2016) 
Program Elements 
Bundling payments for services that patients receive across a single episode of care is one 
way to encourage doctors, hospitals and other healthcare providers to work together to better 
coordinate care for patients before, during and after their hospitalization. The CMS application 
for acceptance into the BPCI program required certain design and administration aspects to be 
addressed, giving wide latitude for organizations to customize an implementation and operational 
model. Keys requirements were: 
1. Build infrastructure to support the implementation including executive leadership, 
team, governance, information systems, and administrative processes 
2. Generate and use actionable data including approaches to share it with stakeholders 
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3. Improve processes and redesign care including care pathways and protocols, 
enhancement of care delivery, patient activation, engagement and risk management, 
care coordination, and system changes to support care 
4. Meet terms and conditions of BPCI including reporting quality measures and 
notifying patients of the program 
Many studies point to these design elements as critical success factors in getting 
prepared, operationalizing a bundled payments program, and moreover delivering on the 
objectives of high-quality care at the lowest cost. No standard blueprint seems to exist to guide 
organizations. Table 1 below shows 13 different program strategies gleaned from recent 
literature. While each has subtle nuances, there are a number of common themes: having the 
right leadership setting the vision and championing the program; hospital and physicians in true 
partnership and alignment; patient engagement and education throughout the care journey; 
transparency and communication with all care providers and patients; metrics defined and data to 
support it coupled with systems and staff to manage and share it; and re-designed care pathways 
that are continuously monitored and improved. 
Table 1. Literature review of bundled payment program implementation strategies.  
Study Author(s) 
and Date 
Summary of Knowledge 
Contribution 
Detailed Information 
Bozic, 2015 10-Step Process Assess cultural readiness; Leadership champions; 
Define episodes; Define performance metrics; Map 
episode of care; Measure costs; Identify process 
improvement areas; Re-engineer care to improve 
outcomes; Price the episode and market it; Iterate  
Caillouette, 2015  Critical Success Factor True partnership and alignment between physicians 
and hospital through education, shared equity and 
governance, defined and tracked metrics 
DiGioia III et al., 
2016  
7 Segments of Care Process maps for each of 7 segments of care to 
identify true costs (activity-based costing): Pre-
Op/Office; Pre-Op Testing and Consults; Day of 
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Study Author(s) 
and Date 
Summary of Knowledge 
Contribution 
Detailed Information 
Surgery/OR; PACU; Inpatient Stay; Therapy; Follow 
Up Visits 
Edwards & Barnes, 
2016  
Steps to Avoid Outliers 
and Minimize Variation 
Appropriate patient selection; Set patient 
expectations; Pre-operative evaluation; Joint 
Academy pre-operative education; Communication; 
Joint Hotline for patients 
Elbuluk & O'Neill, 
2017  
Implementation Success 
Factors 
Establish vision and strategy; Define the bundle; 
Integration with providers; Tailored orthopedic care 
suites, Physician education, Transparency 
Froemke et al., 2015  3 Phases of Care Pre-operative: patient education, set expectations; 
Operative: reduce impact of key cost drivers; Post-
operative: discharge home, follow-up and rapid 
PT/OT 
Froimson, 2015 Complete Care Program Patients are managed pre-operatively; Patient and 
family are prepared and educated; Physician 
leadership is activated; Cultural shift must occur with 
the teams 
Haas et al., 2015 3 Keys for Successful 
Bundling 
Data on outcomes and costs; Proactive management 
of patients; Alignment of physicians and hospitals 
Kim & Iorio, 2017  5 Clinical Pillars Optimizing patient selection; Optimizing care 
coordination; Using multimodal pain management 
protocol; Optimizing blood management; 
Minimizing post-acute facility utilization 
Pizzo & Ryan, 2016  4 Strategies for 
Succeeding with Bundled 
Payments 
Obtain needed data; Assess data thoroughly; 
Understand what is in the bundle; Engage 
stakeholders 
Rana, 2016 Framework to 
Successfully Introduce 
APM 
APM design; Building a dedicated team; Identifying 
and implementing performance metrics; 
Incorporating risk adjustment intake; Clinical care 
pathways, protocols and care coordination 
Schutzer, 2015  2 Primary Challenges – 
How to Get Started 
Right leadership – physicians, hospital and 
alignment; Credible data – cost, quality, outcomes 
Slover, 2016a  Patient Engagement is 
Critical 
Patient education; Patient engagement; Shared 
decision making; “Skin in the game” 
 
Gainsharing and Risk-Bearing 
Bundled payments introduced changes in the traditional motivating factors with 
gainsharing, risk-bearing, quality outcome goals, and cost targets. Gainsharing has roots dating 
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back to at least the 1930s when Joe Scanlon devised a program to revitalize the steel industry by 
motivating staff with the promise of shared savings and gains (Anoushiravani & Nunley, 2017). 
However, hospital-physician gainsharing in most forms had long been illegal, as there was 
concern that physicians would steer patients (sometimes, healthy patients) to specific hospitals 
for financial advantage. Over time, gainsharing programs in the healthcare industry, particularly 
in alternative payment model programs, have been accepted with specific design features and 
safeguards. This is certainly true for the BPCI program where gainsharing incentives are 
expected to align hospitals, physicians and post-acute care providers in the redesign of care to 
achieves savings and improve quality (CMS, 2013). 
Two stipulations in BPCI Model 2 are that 1.) the hospital bears the downside risk and 
physician do not bear any risk, and 2.) gains may be shared with physicians if the hospital’s 
program design includes it, but the gains are capped at 50 percent of the CMS physician 
payment. There is considerable literature and research on employee compensation models that 
include elements of risk and gain, especially in manufacturing, but more recently in service 
industries such as healthcare. The topic is complex and somewhat beyond the scope of this study, 
however, it bears mentioning that this is likely a very important aspect to the success or failure of 
a bundled payment program. More specifically, whether the lack of risk bearing is impactful and 
whether the amount of potential gains is large enough to change behaviors. Two studies indicate 
that hospital-physician relationships are challenging in that their goals only partly overlap and a 
partnership requires more than just financial incentives (Burns & Muller, 2008; Lee & Cosgrove, 
2014). Alexander et al. (2001) and Gomez-Mejia et al. (2000) published studies about risk 
assumption and gainsharing in healthcare and they highlight differences in impact between an 
individual physician’s assumption of risk and gains, and that of a physician group. Emphasizing 
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individual performance can generate an effect of reducing alignment between physicians and the 
health system – the opposite of the BPCI objective to create a culture of shared fate. 
Findings from Literature 
CMS BPCI Results  
With over 1500 providers participating in the voluntary bundled payments program, the 
first annual evaluation report issued in February 2015 covering quantitative data for only one 
quarter of program participation (October – December 2013) showed slight improvements in cost 
and quality data, but not statistically significant (Lewin, 2015). Specifically, for model 2, there 
were 9 hospitals who performed 698 LEJR episodes in the quarter. Although none of the results 
were statistically significant, the three outcome measures all declined, as desired. Length of stay 
decreased from 4.4 to 4.3 days, costs for both hospital and physicians decreased slightly, and 
readmissions rates fell from 8.6% to 6.7%. 
The second annual evaluation report was issued in August 2016 covering quantitative 
data for five quarters of program participation (October 2013 – December 2014). Again, the 
results showed incremental improvements in cost and quality data (Lewin, 2016). By this time, 
there were 110 hospitals in Model 2 with over 42,500 episodes, of which 82 hospital participated 
in 17,000 LEJR episodes. The majority of the Model 2 hospitals were large, not-for-profit, 
teaching hospitals in urban, higher median income areas. Again, across all episodes, there were 
not any statistically significant changes in cost or quality. However, for LEJR, there were mixed 
results, statistically. Payments decreased 3% ($864/episode), skilled nursing facility (SNF) 
length of stay decreased by 1.3 days, and institutional post-acute care (SNF and other inpatient) 
use decreased 4.9%. There was no statistically significant change in readmissions rate though. A 
closing remark in the Lewin (2016) report affirms the inconclusive results: 
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“We remain limited in our ability to estimate the impact of the initiative under most 
Model and episode combinations because of insufficient sample size and the limited time 
the initiative has been underway.” 
Empirical Study Results 
Several other published studies with empirical results from specific providers in the joint 
replacement BPCI program also validate those initial Lewin report findings – some cost and 
quality improvements, along with some other interesting observations, such as significant 
changes in discharge disposition. Results from seven published research papers are shown in 
Table 2 below. All participated in the LEJR episodes early in the program (2013) and all present 
positive and similar outcomes of lower costs, length of stay and readmissions, despite challenges 
and relatively low number of patients. 
Table 2. Literature review of bundled payment program results. 
Study Author  
and Date 
Study 
Parameters 
Data  
Collection 
Cost 
Results 
LOS  
(days) 
Readmit 
Results 
Discharge 
Disposition 
Bolz & Iorio, 2016 
Iorio et al., 2016 
LEJR 
90 days 
n=721 
2013-2014 ↓ 8.1-17% ↓ 1.2 ↓ 6% ↑ 8% Home 
↑ 34% HH 
↓ 41% IP 
Doran & Zabinski, 
2015 
LEJR 
30 days 
n=559 
2013-2014 ↓ 9-9.5% ↓ 1.1-1.4 ↓ 0.5% ↓ 33% IP 
Dummit et al., 2016 LEJR 
30/90 days 
n=31,700 
2013-2015 ↓ 10.8% ↓ 0.5 No 
statistical 
difference 
↑ 8% Home 
 
Edwards et al., 2017 LEJR 
90 days 
n=461 
2013-2014 ↓ 14% ↓ 1.24 ↓ 6% N/A 
Froemke et al., 2015 LEJR 
90 days 
n=317 
2013 ↓ 6% ↓ 0.52 N/A ↑ 9.6% Home  
↓ 7.4% HH 
↓ 2.2% SNF 
Murphy et al, 2016 LEJR 
30 days 
2013-2014 ↓ 9-17% N/A ↓ 5% N/A 
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Factors of Influence 
A number of published studies discussed various contributing factors that are believed to 
impact the bundled payment outcomes. Hospital case mix was shown to be one such concern. 
Case mix represents the diversity, clinical complexity, and the amount of resources required for 
the patient population in the hospital. For hospitals that treat a disproportionate number of 
patients with severe or highly complex problems, bundled payments that are not risk-adjusted 
and rely on regional target prices could be penalized (Fehring, 2016; Ellimoottil, 2016). For 
LEJR orthopedic patients, this means having a higher ratio of DRG 469 (major joint replacement 
with complications or comorbidities) than DRG 470. In addition, Rozell et al. (2016) concluded 
that patients with certain chronic kidney, pulmonary and liver diseases should be excluded from 
alternative payment models. 
Several other studies found more factors that might influence bundled payment financial 
and clinical outcomes. Patients with lower socio-economic status (SES) were found, in at least 
one study, to have longer length of stay, higher readmissions, and more discharges to higher-cost 
rehabilitation facilities. The study concluded that risk adjustment models should also include 
patient SES (Courtney et al., 2017). Patient characteristics such as age, body mass index, and the 
presence of bone fractures were shown to significantly increase the cost of care and length of 
stay (Clement et al., 2016; Newman et al., 2017). Even the hospital geographic region, profit 
status, and surgical day of the week were shown in some studies to cause significant variation in 
cost and care (Hall et al., 2016; Newman et al., 2017). Finally, as the post discharge period of 
time is an important part of the bundled payment episode, two studies discussed post-acute care 
patterns and strategies to manage utilization rates and pointed to this as a key component of any 
bundled payment program (Slover, 2016b; Weeks et al., 2017). 
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Program Challenges 
In spite of proven successes with bundled payment programs, there continue to be 
challenges, opportunities, and flaws in the current and previous value-based payment systems. 
As the healthcare paradigm is complex, Porter and Kaplan (2016) and Porter and Lee (2013) 
discussed a host of objections that have emerged and suggested counter points to each. Some of 
the challenges raised include: it is difficult to define a condition to be covered by a bundled 
payment, it is complicated to implement a bundled payment program, it is difficult to hold 
providers accountable and unrealistic to expect them to work together, outcomes are difficult to 
measure, cost information is lacking, providers will cherry-pick patients for the best outcomes, 
bundled payments will encourage over-treatment, and they will trigger excessive price 
competition. To all of these, Porter and Kaplan suggest that while much work remains on 
bundled payment implementation, it is the way forward for healthcare. 
The literature from the empirical studies above also raise other questions and challenges, 
with a partial list presented here: 
• Providers who have already invested significantly in coordination of care and 
controlling costs seem to be penalized by the historically-based target pricing system. 
• Providers might be tempted to select patients with lower acuity who are more apt to 
have better outcomes and push unhealthier patients to other providers. 
• Hospitals that treat medically complex patients might be penalized by bundled 
payments if outcome goals are not risk-adjusted appropriately. Many other patient 
demographic, socio-economic, and health factors might also be significant. 
• Length of stay targets weighted in the bundled payments program might encourage 
providers to shift patients from the hospital venue to post-acute care, home health or 
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home too soon. The trade-off for lower length of hospital stay could be higher 
readmissions. 
• A parallel activity that is essential in achieving bundled payment goals is internal cost 
control. LEJR procedures use expensive supplies and implantable devices that are 
often not standardized and/or price-negotiated because hospital and physicians have 
historically not been aligned in objectives. 
• Bundled payment programs require an investment in resources, such as financial, 
staffing, technology, and analytics. This might unduly burden small or standalone 
hospitals and/or small-scale implementations. Bundled payments might favor 
Accountable Care Organizations, Clinically Integrated Networks, or other large 
institutions. 
• The challenge for the leaders of healthcare organizations is enormous to shape and 
align the web of incentives in ways that promote the goals while avoiding over- or 
under-provision of services. They must develop incentives that are both effective and 
ethical to motivate physicians and other providers to collaborate to find opportunities 
to improve efficiency and coordinate care, while also exposing them to risk and 
potential revenue losses. 
Literature Contributions and Gaps 
As demonstrated in the foregoing literature review, there is considerable attention 
being paid to the serious problems of increasing healthcare spending and lacking care 
coordination that hinders improved outcomes. Both private and public organizations have 
tackled these issues for many years with numerous alternate payment models and care 
delivery systems. These have often been met with some success, however they have not been 
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widely adopted due to a myriad of challenges. Now, under the ACA law, the bundled 
payment method is again being demonstrated by CMS in the BPCI Initiative. Early results 
seem to point in the positive direction for cost and quality improvements, however, this is 
based on a fairly small sample of participants and limited timeframe of the study. 
Furthermore, the literature reveals that an implementation model or template does not exist 
and that leads to even more of a challenge for organizations to adapt to the new payment and 
care delivery system and realize positive results swiftly. These and many other open issues 
and questions presented here remain to be answered and are signals that additional research is 
called for. 
Summary 
This survey of the literature on the topic of bundled payments laid the foundation for 
the current research that was conducted to observe one hospital’s firsthand experiences with 
BPCI. The study results and implementation models found in the literature were useful in 
understanding how the bundled payment model relates to cost and care quality outcomes. 
This literature review ultimately informed, helped develop, and refined the approach to this 
study that is presented in the following chapters. 
  
 41 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: 
METHODS 
 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the research design and methodology used in this study. It begins 
with a review of the research questions and hypotheses, and then presents the research design 
and the focus of the study. Next is a discussion on the population and sample characteristics and 
the data sources. Then the dataset preparation procedures are presented, as well as a discussion 
on the variables of interest. Finally, it delves into the data analysis tools and techniques used, a 
brief discussion on the qualitative aspect of this study, and it concludes with legal and ethical 
considerations in healthcare data research.  
Research Questions  
The objectives of this study were to answer four specific research questions: 
1. Research Question 1 (financial): What is the relationship between a hospital’s 
participation in a Medicare bundled payment initiative and the cost of care for 
patients with lower extremity joint replacements? 
2. Research Question 2 (operational): What is the relationship between a hospital’s 
participation in a Medicare bundled payment initiative and the utilization of hospital 
services (length of stay) for patients with lower extremity joint replacements? 
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3. Research Question 3 (clinical): What is the relationship between a hospital’s 
participation in a Medicare bundled payment initiative and quality of care 
(readmissions) for patients with lower extremity joint replacements? 
4. Research Question 4 (descriptive): What factors or characteristics shape a hospital’s 
participation in a Medicare bundled payment initiative for patients with lower 
extremity joint replacements? 
Study Hypotheses 
To answer the research questions posed in this study, the null and alternative hypotheses 
to be tested were: 
1. Hypothesis 1 (financial) 
H1o: A hospital’s participation in BPCI Model 2 for Medicare patients with lower 
extremity joint replacements does not lead to better financial outcomes as 
measured by the hospital charges for the care. 
H1a: A hospital’s participation in BPCI Model 2 for Medicare patients with lower 
extremity joint replacements leads to better financial outcomes as measured 
by the hospital charges for the care. 
2. Hypothesis 2 (operational) 
H2o: A hospital’s participation in BPCI Model 2 for Medicare patients with lower 
extremity joint replacements does not lead to better operational outcomes as 
measured by hospital length of stay. 
H2a: A hospital’s participation in BPCI Model 2 for Medicare patients with lower 
extremity joint replacements leads to better operational outcomes as measured 
by hospital length of stay. 
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3. Hypothesis 3 (clinical) 
H3o: A hospital’s participation in BPCI Model 2 for Medicare patients with lower 
extremity joint replacements does not lead to better clinical outcomes as 
measured by hospital readmissions within 30 days.  
H3a: A hospital’s participation in BPCI Model 2 for Medicare patients with lower 
extremity joint replacements leads to better clinical outcomes as measured by 
hospital readmissions within 30 days.  
4. Hypothesis 4 (descriptive) 
H4o: A hospital’s participation in BPCI Model 2 for Medicare patients with lower 
extremity joint replacements cannot be characterized by a set of factors that 
define the program and lead to success. 
H4a: A hospital’s participation in BPCI Model 2 for Medicare patients with lower 
extremity joint replacements can be characterized by a set of factors that 
define the program and lead to success. 
Research Design 
To best answer the study questions, the research design selected was a retrospective 
quantitative analysis of data. The data came from two sources, but it was principally collected by 
the study hospital during a quasi-experimental BPCI initiative conducted in the hospital setting 
where this phenomenon of interest actually occurred. As conducted by the hospital, this was not 
a true experiment because the patients enrolled in the BPCI initiative were not randomly 
selected, but rather they met a set of pre-determined criteria. The internal validity can also be 
challenged because the hospital environment is very complex and involves many extraneous 
variables that could not be controlled (such as patient demographics and comorbidities, attending 
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physicians and surgeons, and post-acute care providers). However, the external validity is likely 
very high since the hospital represents a typical community hospital environment, not unlike 
many in America, characterized by such factors as size, patient volume, case mix, and payer mix. 
The analysis and observations that came from this study might be generalizable to other 
healthcare provider organizations, other patient populations, and other settings or contexts where 
alternative payment models are being considered. 
The intent of this retrospective data analysis was to test causality or explanatory 
relationships to determine if applying the BPCI program elements to a specific patient population 
(treatment group) lead to improved financial, operational and/or clinical outcomes. The treatment 
included a variety of process changes that were implemented specifically to support the BPCI 
program at the commencement of the program in July 2015. These included redesigned LEJR 
care protocols, patient education, clinical team training, care coordination among all providers, 
increased follow-up care, and data analytics. The research study analyzed the treatment group 
data as compared to a control group that consisted of a similar patient population as in the 
treatment group, but not treated. 
The treatment group consisted of all patients enrolled in the BPCI program for the first 18 
months of participation. The control group consisted of all similar patients in the 18 months just 
prior to the BPCI program. The patient selection parameters for the treatment and the control 
groups were the same, except for the actual experimental treatment of participation in the BPCI 
program. There were also implicit controls in this study design. During the timeframe before and 
after the BPCI Initiative, there were no substantial changes in the hospital environment, the 
organization size, facilities, number of admissions, physicians and staff, post-acute care facilities, 
patient demographics, case mix, and number of cases of LEJR. 
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Study Setting 
The data for this study was from a large acute care community hospital located in the 
southeast part of the United States. The hospital was a not-for-profit, multi-specialty, and very 
large single-site hospital with over 850 inpatient beds, more than 130 emergency department 
beds, and a large surgical department with over 20 operating rooms. Its LEJR surgery practice 
had consistent volume, with approximately 82 hip or knee replacement patients per month. There 
were 10-12 orthopedic surgeons performing these procedures, and there were about 36 post-
acute care providers where patients were typically discharged to for continuing care. They were 
comprised of approximately 20 skilled nursing facilities, 12 home health agencies, and smaller 
numbers of inpatient and outpatient rehabilitation centers, and short-term and intermediate-term 
care facilities. These numbers fluctuated over time, albeit minimally, as these physicians, 
patients and organizations entered and exited the community. 
The hospital had a dynamic leadership team and a culture of continuous improvement, 
and that led to their voluntary participation in the BPCI Model 2 Initiative, beginning July 1, 
2015 for a three-year period ending June 30, 2018. Because Model 2 uses a retrospective 
payment system, there was a lag in compiling data, so this particular research study only covered 
an 18-month BPCI period starting July 1, 2015 and ending December 31, 2016. 
Population and Sample 
The study participant sample (n=1147) included all Medicare patients admitted to the 
hospital for hip or knee surgery 18 months prior to the BPCI program through 18 months after 
the BPCI program. This sample was divided into two groups: a treatment group (n=525) of 
patients in the BPCI program, and a control group (n=622) of similar patients from the prior time 
period. Of particular note is a decision that was made to include only Medicare patients in this 
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study and exclude non-Medicare patients that, if included, would have yielded a more robust 
research design with four groups instead of two. This exclusion was done for four reasons. First, 
post-acute care cost data was not available from CMS for non-Medicare patients because they 
were not enrolled in the program. Second, there were significant demographic differences (age, 
complications, and surgery type) between Medicare and non-Medicare patients that would have 
made it difficult to draw conclusions. Third, it would not be possible to isolate the care patterns 
between Medicare and non-Medicare patients because the same clinical, business, and support 
staff interacted with both. Fourth, outcomes and discharge patterns were different across the 
board with non-Medicare patients because they are typically younger and healthier, according to 
literature presented in Chapter Two of this manuscript. 
Treatment Group: All patients enrolled in the BPCI program from July 1, 2015 – 
December 31, 2016 with the following qualifications: insured by Medicare, admitted to the 
hospital for Clinical Group-surgical orthopedic excluding spine and Clinical Episode-major joint 
replacement of the lower extremity in Diagnosis Related Group-469 or 470. 
Control Group: (Similar patients, prior timeframe). All patients from January 1, 2014 – 
June 30, 2015 with the following qualifications: insured by Medicare, admitted to hospital for 
Clinical Group-surgical orthopedic excluding spine and Clinical Episode-major joint 
replacement of the lower extremity in Diagnosis Related Group-469 or 470. 
This sample size gave sufficient information to carry out the tests desired. Whether it is 
representative of the target population is a question for discussion (refer to Chapter Five of this 
manuscript). Lewin (2016), in the CMS BPCI Models 2-4: Year 2 Evaluation and Monitoring 
Annual Report, indicated that there were 81 hospitals and 17,004 episodes of LEJR in the first 
year of BPCI. Annualized and extrapolated across time, this meant that the study sample 
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treatment group was about two percent of the total population. The methodology used in this 
study, however, was similar to the methods used by CMS and its program evaluation partners. 
Therefore, it paved the way for this study and it might provide a basis for further study of this 
topic with additional hospital data. 
Data Sources  
There were two secondary data sources used in this study. First, the hospital had robust 
electronic health records that contain financial, operational and clinical data for every patient 
encounter, including admissions to the hospital and outpatient visits for emergency care and 
other procedures and tests. Second, as part of the agreement with CMS for participating in the 
BPCI Initiative, patient-level claims data was made available to the hospital that contained 
detailed readmissions and cost data, especially for the post-acute care that is not normally 
available to the hospital. These data sources are described more fully in the following 
paragraphs. 
Hospital Data 
First, a delimited file containing the study sample patient data records was produced by 
the hospital’s analytics department according to the field requirements mutually agreed to and 
approved by the Institutional Review Board. It was appropriately de-identified according to 
healthcare industry standards. Refer to the Ethical Considerations section at the end of this 
chapter for more detail on that topic. This file contained 1147 patient encounter records for 36 
months, which created a fairly balanced before and after study with similar numbers of records in 
each group that meet the selection criteria of LEJR episodes. Each of the records contained 16 
fields of data for the patient encounters. The file is illustrated in the following Tables 3 and 4: 
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Table 3. Summary of records in hospital data file. 
Before BPCI After BPCI 
January 1, 2014 – June 30, 2015 July 1, 2015 – December 31, 2016 
622 Medicare LEJR Records 525 Medicare LEJR Records 
 
Table 4. Detail of records in hospital data file. 
Category Fields Purpose 
Patient 
Descriptors 
⋅ Unique Encounter Number 
⋅ Patient Age (range bands) 
⋅ Payor Code 
⋅ Femur Fracture (Y/N) 
⋅ Hip or Knee (H/K) 
⋅ Diagnosis Code 
⋅ Pre-Operative Education (Y/N) 
⋅ Connect the data sources 
⋅ Descriptive 
⋅ Potential demographic factors to 
consider 
Episode 
Descriptors 
⋅ Admit Date (monthly bands) 
⋅ Surgeon Code 
⋅ Surgical Site Infection (Y/N) 
⋅ Deep Vein Thrombosis/PE (Y/N) 
⋅ Discharge Disposition Code 
⋅ Discharge Disposition Agency 
⋅ Filter before and after data 
⋅ Descriptive 
⋅ Potential clinical factors to consider 
Outcome 
Variables 
⋅ Hospital Charges ($) 
⋅ Hospital Length of Stay (days) 
⋅ 30-Day Readmissions (Y/N) 
⋅ Dependent variables to study 
hypotheses 
⋅ Outcomes – financial, operational, 
clinical 
 
CMS Data 
Second, a delimited file was received from CMS containing some additional data about 
the patient episodes for a subset of the study sample patient data. As with the hospital file, it was 
appropriately de-identified according to healthcare industry standards. This file contained 367 
patient encounter records for 12 months of BPCI performance from July 1, 2015 – June 30, 
2016. Note that this file did not contain any data for patient encounters prior to the start of the 
BPCI program or for the latter 6 months of the study timeframe. Unfortunately, this weakened 
 49 
the study design with respect to the financial outcome, as the control group data was not 
available. However, this deficiency was compensated for as explained later in this chapter. 
Furthermore, the CMS file only contained treatment group data for the first 12 of the 18 months 
of BPCI program participation due to a lag in CMS processing and distribution of the program 
data. Since the BPCI program defines an episode to include all patient care services extending 30 
days after hospital discharge, hospitals such as the study site are dependent upon CMS to provide 
the additional data for the 30 days of post discharge care in order to evaluate the readmissions 
and total payment information. Each of the records in the CMS file contained 12 fields of data 
for the patient encounters. The file is illustrated in the following Tables 5 and 6. 
Table 5. Summary of records in CMS data file. 
Before BPCI After BPCI 
January 1, 2014 – June 30, 2015 July 1, 2015 – June 30, 2016 
No data provided by CMS 367 Medicare LEJR Records 
 
Table 6. Detail of records in CMS data file. 
Category Fields Purpose 
Patient 
Descriptor 
⋅ Unique Encounter Number ⋅ Connect the data sources 
Readmissions 
Data 
⋅ SNF Length of Stay (days) 
⋅ SNF Readmissions 
⋅ SNF Length of Stay for Readmission 
⋅ Descriptive 
⋅ Potential clinical factors to consider 
Payment 
Data 
⋅ Hospital Payment ($) 
⋅ SNF Payment ($) 
⋅ SNF Readmissions Payment ($) 
⋅ Outpatient Payment ($) 
⋅ Home Health Payment ($) 
⋅ Medical Equipment Payment ($) 
⋅ Physician Payment ($) 
⋅ Total Episode Payment ($) 
⋅ Dependent variables to study one 
hypothesis 
⋅ Outcome – financial 
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Dataset Preparation Procedures 
Preparing the study dataset involved several steps to combine, clean and code the data. 
This is described here and illustrated below in Figure 12. 
1. Combine the hospital and CMS files using the unique encounter number that was common to 
both files. This operation was accomplished by importing both files into separate worksheets 
in a Microsoft Excel workbook and using the VLOOKUP() function to match the encounter 
numbers and combine the data. The result was a single Excel worksheet. 
2. Review and clean the resulting file by removing extraneous data (some rows and columns) 
that was included in the original raw files. This was accomplished by deleting columns other 
than those described earlier and applying filters to ensure that the only rows that remained 
met the study criteria: Medicare patients (Payor Code=M11 or M14), LEJR procedures 
(DRG Code=469 or 470), and 36-month date range (Admit Date=2014-01 through 2016-12). 
The result was an Excel worksheet with 1147 rows and 27 columns (16 hospital + 12 CMS – 
1 duplicate encounter number). 
3. Normalize the hospital charges data so that dollar amounts would be comparable across the 
study timeframe. This was accomplished by applying an algorithm that increased the charges 
data and compounded as appropriate for specific time ranges. This corresponded with 
hospital rate increases and materials contract changes that occurred at points during the 
study. The methodology was validated by hospital subject matter experts. 
4. Code the data for proper analysis required by the statistical software package by adding 
columns where necessary and using Excel filters, sorting, find and replace, and copy and 
paste. In total, 13 new fields/columns were added. Of those, 10 were coded as numeric binary 
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fields by assigning 0 and 1 values to existing data; 1 new field was added to interpret 
admission dates in monthly bands; 1 new field was added to code discharge disposition text 
into numeric codes; and 1 new field was added for the BPCI Target price. The final study 
dataset was an Excel worksheet with 1147 rows and 40 columns and the layout is shown in 
Table 7 below. 
 
Figure 12. Illustration of study dataset preparation process. 
Table 7. Final study dataset layout. 
No. Field Source  Description 
1 ENCOUNTER_ID HOSP Unique Encounter Number (numeric) 
2 AGE_CODE HOSP Patient Age Range Code (numeric) 
3 PAYOR_CODE HOSP Payor Code (text) 
4 FRACTURE_TXT HOSP Femur Fracture (text) 
5 HIP_KNEE_TXT HOSP Hip or Knee (text) 
6 MSDRG_CODE HOSP Diagnosis Code (numeric) 
7 PREOP_ED_FLAG HOSP Pre-Operative Education (Y/N) 
8 ADMIT_DATE HOSP Admit Date (date) 
9 SURGEON_CODE HOSP Surgeon Code (numeric) 
10 SSI_FLAG HOSP Surgical Site Infection (1/0) 
11 DVTPE_FLAG HOSP Deep Vein Thrombosis/PE (1/0) 
12 DC_DISPO_TYPE HOSP Discharge Disposition Type (text) 
13 DC_DISPO_AGENCY HOSP Discharge Disposition Agency (text) 
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No. Field Source  Description 
14 HOSP_CHRG  HOSP Hospital Charges ($) 
15 HOSP_LOS HOSP Hospital Length of Stay (days) 
16 READMIT_FLAG HOSP 30-Day Readmissions Flag (1/0) 
17 HOSP_PMT CMS Hospital Payment ($) 
18 SNF_PMT CMS SNF Payment ($) 
19 SNF_LOS CMS SNF Length of Stay (days) 
20 SNF_READMIT_AGNCY CMS SNF Readmissions Agency (text) 
21 SNF_READMIT_PMT CMS SNF Readmissions Payment ($) 
22 SNF_READMIT_LOS CMS SNF Length of Stay Readmissions (days) 
23 OP_PMT CMS Outpatient Payment ($) 
24 HH_PMT CMS Home Health Payment ($) 
25 DME_PMT CMS Medical Equipment Payment ($) 
26 PHYSICIAN_PMT CMS Physician Payment ($) 
27 TOT_ALLOWED_PMT CMS Total Episode Payment ($) 
28 BP_FLAG NEW BPCI Treatment Period Flag (1/0) 
29 MC_FLAG NEW Medicare Patient Flag (1/0) 
30 ADMIT_MONTH NEW Admit Date (YYYY-MM) 
31 OVER65_FLAG NEW Patient Age Over 65 Flag (1/0) 
32 KNEE_FLAG NEW Knee or Hip Flag (1/0) 
33 DRG470_FLAG NEW DRG 470 or 469 Flag (1/0) 
34 DCHOME_FLAG NEW Discharge Home Flag (1/0) 
35 DCHH_FLAG NEW Discharge Home Health Flag (1/0) 
36 DCSNF_FLAG NEW Discharge SNF Flag (1/0) 
37 DCIRF_FLAG NEW Discharge Inpatient Rehab Flag (1/0) 
38 DCEXP_FLAG NEW Discharge Expired Flag (1/0) 
39 DCDISPO_CODE NEW Discharge Disposition Code (numeric) 
40 TARGET_PMT NEW BPCI Target Payment ($) 
 
Variables of Interest 
Although many of the variables in the study dataset were statistically or generally 
described and analyzed as potential contributors to the results, the following variables were of 
particular interest in answering the research questions and evaluating the hypotheses. 
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Independent Variable 
The BPCI treatment flag, BP_FLAG, was used to separate the treatment group data from 
the control group data. This flag was a categorical variable assigned a value of 1 if the patient 
admission date was in the BPCI program 18-month date range July 1, 2015 – December 31, 
2016. The flag was assigned a value of 0 if the patient admission date was in the 18-month 
period before the BPCI program: January 1, 2014 – June 30, 2015. It was effectively the proxy 
variable that indicated whether the BPCI treatment was applied to the patient. 
Dependent Variables 
The first three hypotheses considered whether financial, operational and clinical 
outcomes changed after BPCI treatment and therefore required the evaluation of three dependent 
variables, respectively: hospital charges, hospital length of stay, and 30-day readmissions flag. 
Total episode payment and target payment were also analyzed as dependent variables, despite 
missing values. These are all described below. 
Hospital charges, HOSP_CHRG, a continuous variable expressed in dollars, was a 
measure of the total charges submitted by the hospital for each patient. This variable did not 
include post-acute care charges, which would give a more complete view of financial outcomes, 
but that data was not available for the control group of patients. Furthermore, it is important to 
note that hospital charges are not the same as CMS payments; CMS made payments based on 
allowable amounts. However, the value of using hospital charges in this instance was in 
discovering whether the hospital was able to make progress in containing its costs for BPCI 
patients – one of the main goals of BPCI program. Furthermore, two recent studies showed that 
hospital charges generally have a linear relationship to payments, and on average, hospital 
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charges were 3.6 times the CMS reimbursement amount for major joint replacements 
(Nwachukwu et al., 2015; Thakore et al., 2015). 
Hospital length of stay, HOSP_LOS, a continuous variable expressed in days, was a 
measure of how long a patient spent in the hospital before, during and after the LEJR surgery. It 
was a CMS-accepted measure that indicated operational outcomes. 
30-day readmissions flag, READMIT_FLAG, a categorical variable expressed as 1 for 
yes or 0 for no, was an indication of whether the patient was readmitted to the hospital within 30 
days of the LEJR surgery. It was a CMS-accepted measure that indicated clinical outcomes. 
Total episode payment, TOT_ALLOWED_PMT, a continuous variable expressed in 
dollars, was a measure of the bundled payment made by CMS for all patient care services 
associated with the episode. This data was only available for the first 12 months of BPCI 
treatment group patients. Since it could not be compared to the control group, it was instead 
compared to the target payment, TARGET_PMT, a continuous variable expressed in dollars, 
which was the contractual amount agreed to by the hospital. While this method of analysis did 
not strictly follow the research design (compare treatment to control), it added to the body of 
knowledge about financial outcomes. 
Missing Values 
There were no missing values for any of the hospital-provided data. The CMS file only 
contained data for the first 12 months of BPCI treatment. As such, all of the control group and 
the latter 6 months of the treatment group had missing values for the CMS payment data and the 
SNF readmissions data. This was not unexpected and the research design compensated for this. 
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Data Analysis 
Various tools and techniques were selected to analyze the data depending upon the best 
fit for each research question and the variables under analysis. These are described below and 
summarized in Table 8. 
Tools and Techniques 
Three software tools were used in combination to describe the data and show the results 
of the study: Microsoft Excel, Tableau Desktop Professional and IBM SPSS Statistics. All three 
of these are among market leading software tools for data management, manipulation, charting 
and description, statistical analysis, and data visualization. 
Similarly, several different analysis techniques were selected based on the research 
question and the variables available. These included 1.) descriptive statistics for mean, standard 
deviation, and other summary information; 2.) trend charting over time; 3.) normality testing and 
histograms for data distribution charting; 4.) homogeneity of variances testing; 5.) outlier data 
analysis; and 6.) hypotheses testing for comparison of means and proportions. 
Descriptive Statistics 
The first phase of data analysis was to gain a general overview of the data and patterns. 
This was accomplished by running descriptive statistics in Excel to discover how the average 
patient demographics and outcomes compared between treatment and controls groups. If the 
demographics were similar, it would lend validity to the design of comparing these two groups. 
Parenthetically, this same view was also looked at for a set of non-Medicare patients to validate 
its rejection from this study. 
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Research Question 1 Analysis 
The analysis for research question 1 was to determine if financial outcomes changed 
statistically from before the bundled payment program to after. First, summary statistics were run 
on the dependent variable hospital charges in SPSS to see the means for treatment and control 
groups. Second, a trend chart of mean hospital charges by month was produced in Tableau with 
mathematically-calculated trend lines to visualize the data, including the p-value to determine the 
significance of the changes. Third, a normality test was run on the two samples (control and 
treatment) to determine whether the hospital charges data was normally distributed. This was an 
assumption for hypothesis testing, even though the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) applies to this 
data. CLT posits that for non-normal data, the distribution of the sample means is approximately 
normal, regardless of the distribution of the original data if the sample size is large enough 
(typically greater than 30) and all samples have the same size. Fourth, a homogeneity test was 
run to determine if equal variances existed. This was another assumption for hypothesis testing. 
Fifth, a hypothesis test on the two independent samples (t-test) was run in SPSS to be able to 
reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistical 
change in hospital charges from before to after the BPCI program. The alternative hypothesis 
stated that there was a statistical change in hospital charges between the two groups. 
H1o: μt = μc H1a: μt ≠ µc 
μt = mean hospital charges for the treatment group 
μc = mean hospital charges for the control group 
Sixth, the non-parametric equivalent of t-test, Mann-Whitney U test, was also run because the 
data was found to be not normally distributed. This was only used as a weak second check since 
this test is more appropriate for ordinal data.  
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Next, because the data was found to be not morally distributed with evidence of outliers, 
an analysis was conducted after removing major outliers to discover if the hypothesis test results 
were similar or different. Major outliers were defined as hospital charges values residing below 
the median of the bottom quartile minus 3 times the interquartile range (IQR) and residing above 
the median of the highest quartile plus 3 times the IQR. 
The analysis described above was repeated four more times on subsets of the data to 
determine if the hospital charges changed significantly for specific patient types. These were 
knee replacement only patients, hip replacement only patients, patients without complications 
and/or comorbidities, and patients with complications and/or comorbidities. These datasets were 
filtered subsets of the full dataset based on the fields KNEE_FLAG and DRG470_FLAG. 
Finally, CMS payment data for the treatment group (all that was available) was charted as 
the mean payments by month with trend lines to visualize the data. This was done for individual 
payments to see the variability and also total payments compared to target payments, again to 
visualize the BPCI program financial outcomes. 
Research Question 2 Analysis 
The analysis for research question 2 was to determine if operational outcomes changed 
statistically from before the bundled payment program to after. First, summary statistics were run 
on the dependent variable hospital length of stay in SPSS to see the means for treatment and 
control groups. Second, a trend chart of mean hospital length of stay by month was produced in 
Tableau with mathematically-calculated trend lines to visualize the data, including the p-value to 
determine the significance of the changes. Third, a normality test was run on the two samples 
(control and treatment) to determine whether the hospital length of stay data was normally 
distributed. This was an assumption for hypothesis testing, even though the Central Limit 
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Theorem (CLT) applies to this data. CLT posits that for non-normal data, the distribution of the 
sample means is approximately normal, regardless of the distribution of the original data if the 
sample size is large enough (typically greater than 30) and all samples have the same size. 
Fourth, a homogeneity test was run to determine if equal variances existed. This was another 
assumption for hypothesis testing. Fifth, a hypothesis test on the two independent samples (t-test) 
was run in SPSS to be able to reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis 
stated that there was no statistical change in hospital length of stay from before to after the BPCI 
program. The alternative hypothesis stated that there was a statistical change in hospital length of 
stay between the two groups. 
H2o: μt = μc H2a: μt ≠ µc 
μt = mean hospital length of stay for the treatment group 
μc = mean hospital length of stay for the control group 
Sixth, the non-parametric equivalent of t-test, Mann-Whitney U test, was also run because the 
data was found to be not normally distributed. This was only used as a weak second check since 
this test is more appropriate for ordinal data. 
Next, because the data was found to be not morally distributed with evidence of outliers, 
an analysis was conducted after removing major outliers to discover if the hypothesis test results 
were similar or different. Major outliers were defined as hospital length of stay values residing 
below the median of the bottom quartile minus 3 times the interquartile range (IQR) and residing 
above the median of the highest quartile plus 3 times the IQR. 
Finally, the analysis described above was repeated four more times on subsets of the data 
to determine if the hospital length of stay changed significantly for specific patient types. These 
were knee replacement only patients, hip replacement only patients, patients without 
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complications and/or comorbidities, and patients with complications and/or comorbidities. These 
datasets were filtered subsets of the full dataset based on the fields KNEE_FLAG and 
DRG470_FLAG. 
Research Question 3 Analysis 
The analysis for research question 3 was to determine if clinical outcomes changed 
statistically from before the bundled payment program to after. First, summary statistics were run 
on the dependent variable 30-day readmissions flag in SPSS to see the proportions for treatment 
and control groups. Second, a trend chart of mean rate of 30-day readmissions by month was 
produced in Tableau with mathematically-calculated trend lines to visualize the data, including 
the p-value to determine the significance of the changes. Third, a Chi-Square 2x2 contingency 
table test for independence was run in SPSS to assess the relationship between the two 
categorical variables to be able to reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis 
stated that there was no statistical change in the proportion of 30-day readmissions from before 
to after the BPCI program. The alternative hypothesis stated that there was a statistical change in 
the proportion of 30-day readmissions between the two groups. 
H3o: μt = μc H3a: μt ≠ µc 
μt = proportion of 30-day readmissions for the treatment group 
 
μc = proportion of 30-day readmissions for the control group 
 
Finally, the analysis described above was repeated four more times on subsets of the data 
to determine if the proportion of 30-day readmissions changed significantly for specific patient 
types. These were knee replacement only patients, hip replacement only patients, patients 
without complications and/or comorbidities, and patients with complications and/or 
comorbidities. These datasets were filtered subsets of the full dataset based on the fields 
KNEE_FLAG and DRG470_FLAG. 
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Research Question 4 Analysis 
The analysis for research question 4 was to determine if there were factors or 
characteristics that shaped the hospital’s participation in the BPCI program. This entailed a 
qualitative analysis of the hospital BPCI program design documents to attempt to determine what 
changes were implemented such as care protocols, patient education, clinical team training, care 
coordination among providers, follow-up care, and data analytics. The features and factors were 
then illustrated in a model. 
Table 8. Summary of data analysis to answer research questions. 
Research Question Variables  
(Independent and Dependent) 
Analysis 
RQ1 (financial): What is the 
relationship between a hospital’s 
participation in a Medicare 
bundled payment initiative and 
the cost of care for LEJR 
patients? 
IV: BPCI Treatment 
DV: Hospital Charges 
DV: Total Episode Payment 
DV: Target Payment 
⋅ Descriptive - Mean 
⋅ Normality Test: 
Shapiro-Wilk 
⋅ Trend Chart with p-value 
⋅ Hypothesis Test: t-test 
and Mann-Whitney U 
RQ2 (operational): What is the 
relationship between a hospital’s 
participation in a Medicare 
bundled payment initiative and 
the utilization of hospital 
services (length of stay) for 
LEJR patients? 
IV: BPCI Treatment 
DV: Hospital Length of Stay 
 
⋅ Descriptive - Mean 
⋅ Normality Test:  
Shapiro-Wilk 
⋅ Trend Chart with p-value 
⋅ Hypothesis Test: t-test 
and Mann-Whitney U 
RQ3 (clinical): What is the 
relationship between a hospital’s 
participation in a Medicare 
bundled payment initiative and 
quality of care (readmissions) or 
LEJR patients? 
IV: BPCI Treatment 
DV: 30-day Readmissions Flag 
 
⋅ Descriptive – mean 
⋅ Hypothesis Test:  
Chi-Square 2x2 
Contingency 
⋅ Trend Chart with p-value 
RQ4 (descriptive): What factors 
or characteristics shape a 
hospital’s participation in a 
Medicare bundled payment 
initiative or LEJR patients? 
All variables and program 
design elements 
⋅ Qualitative Review 
⋅ Illustrative Modeling 
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Legal and Ethical Considerations 
The data files contained Protected Health Information (PHI), which broadly includes any 
part of a patient's medical record or payment history, and is subject to the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Privacy Rule. With guidance and methods 
from the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services web site (http://www.hhs.gov), this data 
was de-identified in accordance with the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s de-identification standard to 
protect the privacy of the study participants. As is the policy at the hospital and the University of 
South Florida (USF), a proposal for this research was presented to both entities’ Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) for consideration and/or approval prior to accessing the datasets or 
commencing the study analysis. The USF IRB determined that this study did not meet the 
definition of human subjects research. The hospital IRB approved the study under its human 
subjects research exemption. Therefore, the study was not under the purview of either IRB and 
further approval was not required. The official letters from the IRBs are included in Appendix E 
and Appendix F. 
Summary 
The research design and methodology described in this chapter were selected and tailored 
for this study with the expectation that the research questions would be answered. The 
quantitative results would lead to rejecting or failing to reject the three outcome-focused null 
hypotheses, and there would also be some degree of explanation about the factors impacting the 
results. Finally the qualitative aspect of this study was expected to yield a descriptive model of 
the BPCI implementation at the study hospital. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
RESULTS 
 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the results of the data analysis and the findings of the study. It 
begins with a summary of descriptive results of the hospital’s BPCI program characteristics and 
the data sample studied. Next, it gives a summary statement of the results of the data analysis, 
followed by a detailed presentation of the data analysis and results organized by research 
question. It concludes with a brief summation of the results that lead into the discussion in 
Chapter Five. 
Summary of Descriptive Results 
Description of Hospital BPCI Program 
The BPCI program characteristics elected by the study hospital are outlined in the Table 
9 below. This information was extracted from the agreement with CMS and it was important to 
the context of the results and findings. In particular, the post discharge period was selected to be 
30 days rather than the longer 60-day and 90-day options, which would significantly impact total 
costs, target prices, and risks and incentives. It is also worthy to note that the physician 
gainsharing was contingent upon meeting or exceeding four quality goals: 30-day readmissions 
rate of 6%, surgical site infection rate of 3%, deep vein thrombosis/pulmonary embolism rate of 
0.4%, and pre-operative education rate of 75%. As such, the results of these measures were also 
studied and reported below, in addition to the three main study variables. 
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Table 9. BPCI characteristics for the study hospital. 
BPCI Characteristic Hospital Election 
Dates of Participation ⋅ 3 Year commitment with CMS: 
⋅ July 1, 2015 – June 30, 2018 
Dates of this Study ⋅ First 18 months of program: 
⋅ July 1, 2015 - December 31, 2016 
BPCI Model ⋅ Model 2 for Clinical Episode LEJR  
⋅ DRG 469 and DRG 470 
Post-Discharge Period ⋅ 30 days after hospital discharge 
Target Price Discount ⋅ 3% discount from historical total cost of care (FY2010-2012)  
⋅ With wage index, case mix, volume adjustments 
Incentives and Risks ⋅ Gainsharing with physicians 
⋅ From internal cost savings and CMS payments 
⋅ Capped at 50% of Medicare Payments 
⋅ Hospital bears 100% risk to threshold  
⋅ No patient incentives elected 
Quality Measures and 
Targets 
⋅ 30-day Readmissions Rate (6%) 
⋅ Surgical Site Infection Rate (3%) 
⋅ Deep Vein Thrombosis/Pulmonary Embolism Rate (0.4%) 
⋅ Pre-Operative Education Rate (75%) 
⋅ ED use within 30 days 
⋅ All-cause 30-day mortality rate 
Program Design ⋅ Care Pathways Redesign 
⋅ Patient Activation, Education, Risk Management 
⋅ Care Coordination 
⋅ Organizational Structure 
⋅ Technology and Data Analytics 
Medicare Payment Waivers ⋅ Skilled Nursing Facility 3-day hospital stay waiver 
⋅ Post discharge home visit waiver 
⋅ Telehealth waiver 
 
Description of Dataset Sample Studied 
As discussed briefly in the Method chapter, an early decision to exclude non-Medicare 
patients from the dataset was made for several reasons. Two of those reasons were revealed 
quantitatively by the descriptive information generated from the data. Table 10 below illustrates 
that the patient profile was significantly different between Medicare and non-Medicare patients, 
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in terms of volume (1147 vs. 1806), age (75.4 vs. 65.6), proportion of hip surgeries (47.0% vs. 
40.3%), and proportion of complications (6.1% vs. 3.0%). Furthermore, pre-operative education, 
a BPCI-specific program, was implemented for both cohorts, despite one cohort not being 
enrolled. This means the BPCI treatment spilled into the non-Medicare group. These facts 
supported excluding non-Medicare patients from all further data analysis.  
Table 10. Comparison of Medicare LEJR patients to non-Medicare during study period. 
Description Medicare 
LEJR Patients 
Non-Medicare 
LEJR Patients 
Number of patients total 1147 38.8% 1806 61.2% 
Average age of patients 75.4 --- 65.6 --- 
LEJR Procedure Hip (vs Knee) 539 47.0% 728 40.3% 
Complications DRG 469 (vs 470) 70 6.1% 55 3.0% 
Received pre-operative education after BPCI program 374 71.2% 678 74.8% 
 
The final study dataset contained a control group of 622 Medicare patients before the 
BPCI program was implemented, and a treatment group of 525 Medicare patients enrolled in the 
BPCI program. The patient profiles of these two groups were similar in terms of age (75.5 vs. 
75.3), proportion of hip surgeries (47.1% vs. 46.9%) and proportion of complications (5.8% vs. 
6.5%). The supporting descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix G. Refer to Table 11 for a 
summary overview of the final dataset. 
Table 11. Overview of study dataset patient characteristics. 
Description Control Group 
Before BPCI 
Treatment Group 
After BPCI 
Total 
Number of patients in dataset 622 54.2% 525 45.8% 1147 100% 
Average age of patients 75.5 --- 75.3 --- 75.4 --- 
LEJR Procedure Hip (vs Knee) 293 47.1% 246 46.9% 539 47.0% 
Complications DRG 469 (vs 470) 36 5.8% 34 6.5% 70 6.1% 
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Summary Study Results 
Main Study Results 
The overall findings for research questions 1, 2, and 3 are shown in Table 12 below. In 
summary, the mean hospital charges increased from before BPCI to after BPCI however it was 
not statistically significant as indicated by the p-value (p =0.345). The mean hospital length of 
stay decreased from before BPCI to after BPCI and it was statistically significant as indicated by 
the p-value (p=0.002). The 30-day readmissions proportion increase from before BPCI to after 
BPCI was not statistically significant as indicated by the high p-value (p=0.925). This data is 
presented and explained in detail in the following sections. Refer to Appendices G, H, I and J for 
supporting statistics. 
Table 12. Overall findings for research questions 1, 2, and 3. 
Description Control Group 
Before BPCI 
Treatment Group 
After BPCI 
Statistically 
Significant 
Differences 
 Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Y/N P-value 
RQ1: Hospital charges  
 ($) 
$72,453 $19,960 $73,571 $20,038 N 0.345 
(t-test) 
 Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Y/N P-value 
RQ2:  Hospital length of stay 
 (days) 
3.98 1.80 3.64 1.94 Y 0.002 
(t-test) 
 Proportion Percent Proportion Percent Y/N P-value 
RQ3:  30-day readmissions 
 (proportion) 
0.080 8.0% 0.082 8.2% N 0.925 
(chi-sq) 
 
Additional Results Related to Main Study  
Research questions 1, 2, and 3 were also studied in parsed subsets of data and those 
finding are shown in Table 13 below. In summary, the mean hospital charges did not statistically 
change from before BPCI to after BPCI for knee and hip procedures when analyzed separately, 
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and when DRG 470 (without complications and/or comorbidities) and DRG 469 (with 
complications and/or comorbidities) procedures were analyzed separately. The mean hospital 
length of stay did statistically change from before BPCI to after BPCI for knee procedures, but 
not hip procedures. Similarly, the mean hospital length of stay did statistically change for DRG 
470 procedures, but not for DRG 469 procedures. The 30-day readmissions proportion did not 
statistically change from before BPCI to after BPCI for any of the subsets of patients: knee and 
hip procedures, and DRG 470 and DRG 469 procedures. Refer to Appendices H, I and J for 
supporting statistics. 
Table 13. Additional findings for research questions 1, 2, and 3. 
 Knee Procedures 
Only 
Hip Procedures 
Only 
DRG 470 without 
Complications 
DRG 469 with 
Complications 
 TOP: P-values from relevant statistical tests (t-test, chi-sq) 
BOTTOM: Statistically Significant Difference Before/After BPCI (Y/N) 
RQ1: Hospital 
Charges 
0.114 
N 
0.931 
N 
0.471 
N 
0.682 
N 
RQ2: Hospital 
Length of Stay 
0.002 
Y 
0.066 
N 
0.000 
Y 
0.740 
N 
RQ3: 30-day 
Readmissions 
0.389 
N 
0.548 
N 
0.697 
N 
0.327 
N 
 
Other Results 
The overall findings for the additional quality variables and discharge patterns are shown 
in Tables 14 and 15 below. In summary, the rate of surgical site infections decreased from before 
BPCI to after BPCI and it was statistically significant as indicated by the p-value (p=0.024). The 
rate of deep vein thrombosis/pulmonary embolism did not statistically change (p=0.360). Pre-
operative education was only implemented as part of BPCI so the change from before to after 
was statistically significant (p<0.0001). There were also statistically significant changes in the 
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patient discharge patterns from before to after BPCI. Specifically, discharges to skilled nursing 
facilities and other care facilities decreased as shown by the low p-values. This data is presented 
in detail in the following sections. Refer to Appendix G for supporting summary statistics and 
Appendix K for supporting comparison statistics. 
Table 14. Overall findings for additional quality variables and discharge patterns. 
Description Control Group 
Before BPCI 
Treatment Group 
After BPCI 
Statistically 
Significant 
Differences 
Other Factors Proportion Percent Proportion Percent Y/N P-value 
(chi-sq) 
Surgical Site Infections 0.0096 0.96% 0 0 Y 0.024 
Deep Vein Thrombosis  0.0080 0.80% 0.0038 0.38% N 0.360 
Pre-Operative Education  0 0 0.7124 71.24% Y 0.000 
 
Table 15. Overall findings for discharge patterns. 
Description Control Group 
Before BPCI 
Treatment Group 
After BPCI 
Statistically 
Significant 
Differences 
Discharge Patterns Proportion Percent Proportion Percent Y/N P-value 
(chi-sq) 
Home 0.0579 5.79% 0.0838 8.38% N 0.086 
Home Health (HH) 0.3698 36.98% 0.4114 41.14% N 0.149 
Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF) 0.5386 53.86% 0.4781 47.81% Y 0.041 
Inpatient Rehabilitation (IRF) 0.0161 1.61% 0.0229 2.29% N 0.404 
Expired 0.0048 0.48% 0.0038 0.38% N 0.795 
Other Care 0.0129 1.29% 0 0 Y 0.009 
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Detailed Study Results 
Research Question 1 Results 
The analysis for research question 1 was to determine if financial outcomes changed 
statistically from before the bundled payment program to after. All of the supporting statistics 
related to this research question are in Appendix H. 
Trend Graph. The mean hospital charges (normalized to account for time-based changes 
in rates and materials) for each month over the 36-month study timeframe is illustrated in Figure 
13 below. This shows an increasing pattern both before and after BPCI as indicated by the 
mathematical trend lines. The trend line equation and model are found in Appendix H and a p-
value of 0.0707 indicates that this upward trend is not statistically significant. 
Figure 13. Trend of mean hospital charges before and after BPCI. 
Normality Test. The hospital charges data both before and after BPCI were found to be 
not normal as illustrated in the normality test results, histograms and plots shown in Appendix H. 
Since both sample sizes were less than 2,000, the Shapiro-Wilk test statistic was used. Both p-
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values were very small (p<0.0001) indicating that the null hypotheses that the data was normal 
must be rejected. Therefore the data in both the control and treatments groups were not normal 
distributions.  
Homogeneity of Variance Test. The hospital charges data both before and after BPCI 
were found to have statistically equal variances throughout the dataset as illustrated in the 
homogeneity of variance test results shown in Appendix H. The Levene test statistic was used to 
measure the variances, and the p-value was high (p=0.286), indicating that the null hypotheses 
which states the variances were equal is not rejected.  
Hypothesis Tests. The mean hospital charges increased from $72,453 in the period before 
BPCI to $73,571 in the period after BPCI. Since the objective was to determine whether the 
means were significantly different between two independent samples, a t-test was conducted. At 
a confidence level of 95% and α = 0.05, the p value was found to be 0.345, indicating that the 
increase in hospital charges was not statistically significant. Since the hospital charges data was 
found to be not normally distributed, however, a second hypothesis test was conducted to 
validate the findings. The non-parametric test statistic Mann-Whitney U (although a weak 
validation because the data is not ordinal) produced supporting results (p=0.351) that the change 
is not significant. Therefore there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% 
significance level as shown in Table 16. 
Table 16. Summary of hypothesis 1 results. 
Hypothesis Result 
H1o: μt = μc FAIL TO REJECT 
H1a: μt ≠ µc  
μt = mean hospital charges before BPCI 
μc = mean hospital charges after BPCI 
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Outlier Analysis and Results. The normality test conducted revealed that the hospital 
charges data was not normally distributed. This is also evident by the right-skewed tails in the 
histograms (see Appendix H). The major outliers were verified as valid data and not 
measurement errors or experimental design flaws. However, as a secondary test of the 
hypothesis, 16 data points were excluded based on the formula using 3 times the interquartile 
range described in the methods chapter. The results were the same as those from the complete 
dataset. The outlier-trimmed data was still not normally distributed, the variances were 
homogeneous, and the hypothesis testing resulted in failure to reject the null hypothesis. 
Data Analysis for Knee and Hip Separated. The same set of tests were conducted to 
measure the change in hospital charges for knee-only procedures and again for hip-only 
procedures. All of these four data groups (knee before and after BPCI, and hip before and after 
BPCI) were found to be not normally distributed, however there was homogeneity of variances 
for both knee and hip data. T-tests for both datasets (knee: p=0.114 and hip: p=0.931) indicated 
that hospital charges did not significantly change from before to after BPCI. The non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney U tests also support those findings that the there is insufficient evidence to reject 
the null hypotheses: there was no significant change in hospital charges for knee-only patients or 
for hip-only patients. 
Data Analysis for DRG 470 and DRG 469 Separated. The same set of tests were 
conducted to measure the change in hospital charges for DRG 470-only procedures (without 
complications and/or comorbidities) and again for DRG 469-only procedures (without 
complications and/or comorbidities). All of these four data groups (DRG 470 before and after 
BPCI, and DRG 469 before and after BPCI) were found to be not normally distributed, however 
there was homogeneity of variances for both knee and hip data. T-tests for both datasets (DRG 
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470: p=0.471 and DRG 469: p=0.682) indicated that hospital charges did not significantly 
change from before to after BPCI. The non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests also support those 
findings that there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypotheses: there was no significant 
change in hospital charges for patients with or without complications and/or comorbidities. 
CMS Payment Trends. The seven types of CMS allowed payments that make up the 
BPCI bundled for the treatment group (all that was available) was graphed over the first 12 
months as illustrated in Figure 14 below. This visualization of the data shows a fairly stable 
payment trend for hospital, physician, durable medical equipment, outpatient, and SNF 
readmissions. It shows a trend upward for home health and a downward trend for skilled nursing 
facilities, although the latter had high variability. Figure 15 below shows that both the total CMS 
actual payments and the BPCI target payments trended downward across the first 12 months of 
the BPCI treatment period, however, the gap between them remains, with the target amount 
lower than the actual payments. Both have noticeable variability. 
 
 
Figure 14. Trends of CMS monthly average payments for BPCI patients. 
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Figure 15. Trend of CMS total monthly average payments for BPCI patients. 
Research Question 2 Results 
The analysis for research question 2 was to determine if operational outcomes changed 
statistically from before the bundled payment program to after. All of the supporting statistics 
related to this research question are in Appendix I. 
Trend Graph. The mean hospital length of stay for each month over the 36-month study 
timeframe is illustrated in Figure 16 below. This shows a decreasing pattern both before and after 
BPCI as indicated by the mathematical trend lines. The trend line equation and model are found 
in Appendix I and a p-value of 0.0058 supports this trend as significant. 
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Figure 16. Trend of mean hospital length of stay before and after BPCI. 
 
Normality Test. The hospital length of stay data both before and after BPCI were found 
to be not normal as illustrated in the normality test results, histograms and plots shown in 
Appendix I. Since both sample sizes were less than 2,000, the Shapiro-Wilk test statistic was 
used. Both p-values were very small (p<0.0001) indicating that the null hypotheses that the data 
was normal must be rejected. Therefore the data in both the control and treatments groups were 
not normal distributions.  
Homogeneity of Variance Test. The hospital length of stay data both before and after 
BPCI were found to have statistically equal variances throughout the dataset as illustrated in the 
homogeneity of variance test results shown in Appendix I. The Levene test statistic was used to 
measure the variances, and the p-value was high (p=0.204), indicating that the null hypotheses 
which states the variances were equal is not rejected.  
Hypothesis Tests. The mean hospital length of stay decreased from 3.98 days in the 
period before BPCI to 3.64 days in the period after BPCI. Since the objective was to determine 
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whether the means were significantly different between two independent samples, a t-test was 
conducted. At a confidence level of 95% and α = 0.05, the p value was found to be 0.002, 
indicating that the decrease in hospital length of stay was statistically significant. Since the 
hospital length of stay data was found to be not normally distributed, however, a second 
hypothesis test was conducted to validate the findings. The non-parametric test statistic Mann-
Whitney U (although a weak validation because the data is not ordinal) produced supporting 
results (p<0.0001) that the change was significant. Therefore there is sufficient evidence to reject 
the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level as shown in Table 17. 
Table 17. Summary of hypothesis 2 results. 
Hypothesis Result 
H2o: μt = μc REJECT 
H2a: μt ≠ µc  
μt = mean hospital length of stay before BPCI 
μc = mean hospital length of stay after BPCI 
 
Outlier Analysis and Results. The normality test conducted revealed that the hospital 
length of stay data was not normally distributed. This is also evident by the right-skewed tails in 
the histograms (see Appendix H). The major outliers were verified as valid data and not 
measurement errors or experimental design flaws. However, as a secondary test of the 
hypothesis, 79 data points were excluded based on the formula using 3 times the interquartile 
range described in the methods chapter. The results were the same as those from the complete 
dataset. The outlier-trimmed data was still not normally distributed, the variances were 
homogeneous, and the hypothesis testing resulted in sufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis. 
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Data Analysis for Knee and Hip Separated. The same set of tests were conducted to 
measure the change in hospital length of stay for knee-only procedures and again for hip-only 
procedures. All of these four data groups (knee before and after BPCI, and hip before and after 
BPCI) were found to be not normally distributed, however there was homogeneity of variances 
for both knee and hip data. T-tests for both datasets (knee: p=0.002 and hip: p=0.066) indicated 
that hospital length of stay did significantly change from before to after BPCI for knee patients 
but not for hip patients. The non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests also support those disparate 
findings: there was significant change observed in hospital length of stay for knee-only patients 
but not for hip-only patients. 
Data Analysis for DRG 470 and DRG 469 Separated. The same set of tests were 
conducted to measure the change in hospital length of stay for DRG 470-only procedures 
(without complications and/or comorbidities) and again for DRG 469-only procedures (without 
complications and/or comorbidities). All of these four data groups (DRG 470 before and after 
BPCI, and DRG 469 before and after BPCI) were found to be not normally distributed, however 
there was homogeneity of variances for both knee and hip data. T-tests for both datasets (DRG 
470: p<0.0001 and DRG 469: p=0.740) indicated that hospital length of stay did significantly 
change from before to after BPCI for the DRG 470 patients but not for the DRG 469 patients. 
The non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests also support those disparate findings: there was 
significant change observed in hospital length of stay for patients without complications and/or 
comorbidities but not for patients with complications and/or comorbidities. 
Research Question 3 Results 
The analysis for research question 3 was to determine if clinical outcomes changed 
statistically from before the bundled payment program to after. This was to be achieved by 
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comparing the proportion of 30-day readmissions between the control group and treatment 
group. All of the supporting statistics related to this research question are in Appendix J. 
Trend Graph. The rate of 30-day readmissions for each month over the 36-month study 
timeframe is illustrated in Figure 17 below. This shows an erratic pattern both before and after 
BPCI and a slight overall downward trend as indicated by the mathematical trend lines. The 
trend line equation and model are found in Appendix J and a p-value of 0.6065 indicates that this 
is not a statistically significant trend. 
 
Figure 17. Trend of rate of 30-day readmissions before and after BPCI. 
Hypothesis Test. The proportion of 30-day readmissions slightly increased from 0.080 
(8.0%) in the period before BPCI to 0.082 (8.2%) in the period after BPCI. Since there were two 
independent samples but both variables were categorical, the Chi-Square test applied to a 2×2 
contingency table was used. At a confidence level of 95% and α = 0.05, the p-value was found to 
be 0.925, indicating that the increase in 30-day readmissions proportion was not statistically 
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significant. Therefore there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% 
significance level as shown in Table 18. 
Table 18. Summary of hypothesis 3 results. 
Hypothesis Result 
H3o: μt = μc FAIL TO REJECT 
H3a: μt ≠ µc  
μt = proportion of 30-day readmissions before BPCI 
μc = proportion of 30-day readmissions after BPCI 
 
Data Analysis for Knee and Hip Separated. The same test was conducted to measure the 
change in proportion of 30-day readmissions for knee-only procedures and again for hip-only 
procedures. The Chi Square tests for both datasets (knee: p=0.389 and hip: p=0.548) indicated 
that proportion of 30-day readmissions did not significantly change from before to after BPCI for 
knee-only patients or for hip-only patients. 
Data Analysis for DRG 470 and DRG 469 Separated. The same test was conducted to 
measure the change in proportion of 30-day readmissions for DRG 470-only procedures (without 
complications and/or comorbidities) and again for DRG 469-only procedures (without 
complications and/or comorbidities). The Chi Square tests for both datasets (DRG 470: p=0.697 
and DRG 469: p=0.327) indicated that proportion of 30-day readmissions did not significantly 
change from before to after BPCI for patients with or without complications and/or 
comorbidities. 
Research Question 4 Results 
The analysis for research question 4 was to determine if there were factors or 
characteristics that shaped the hospital’s participation in the BPCI program. A qualitative 
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analysis of the hospital BPCI program design documents showed that numerous changes were 
implemented and these are summarized in the following Figure 18 below. 
 
Figure 18. Illustration of hospital BPCI implementation model. 
Six process steps were undertaken to prepare for, implement, and operationalize the BPCI 
program. These were 1.) establish a leadership structure for accountability, alignment, design and 
oversight; 2.) design the program methods, processes, and supporting information systems; 3.) 
architect the analytics tools and processes; 4.) redesign the care pathways, patient engagement 
processes, education plans, and care delivery and coordination; 5.) develop partnerships and 
create alignment in objectives with providers across the continuum of care; and 6.) ensure that 
the program met CMS reporting and notification compliance.  
The care process redesign step was especially substantial and included redesigning care 
pathways using evidenced-based protocols and patient stratification tools from pre-surgery 
through the post-acute phase, enhancing care delivery with rounding and transition coaches, and 
care coordination using case managers and patient navigators. Finally, education and 
communication programs were developed encompassing all stakeholders from the clinical care 
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team, physicians and surgeons, support staff, and other care providers to the patients and 
families. Each of these steps was substantial on its own and involved many resources and time. 
The intent was to have the program fully designed before the launch, however, the process 
proved to be fluid and required continuous improvement on the march toward successful 
financial, operational and clinical outcomes. 
Other Results 
The analysis on several other variables was to determine if additional quality outcomes 
and discharge patterns changed statistically from before the bundled payment program to after. 
All of the supporting statistics related to the analysis of the other variables are in Appendix K. 
Surgical Site Infections. The rate of surgical site infections for each month over the 36-
month study timeframe is illustrated in Figure 19 below. This shows an erratic pattern before 
BPCI and a flat zero line after BPCI. There was an overall downward trend as indicated by the 
mathematical trend lines. The trend line equation and model had a p-value of 0.0479 which 
indicates that this is a statistically significant trend. This was validated with the Chi-Square test 
statistic. At a confidence level of 95% and α = 0.05, the p-value was found to be 0.024, 
indicating that the decrease in the proportion of surgical site infections from 0.96% before BPCI 
to 0% after BPCI was statistically significant. 
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Figure 19. Trend of rate of surgical site infections before and after BPCI. 
Deep Vein Thrombosis/Pulmonary Embolism. The rate of deep vein 
thrombosis/pulmonary embolism for each month over the 36-month study timeframe is 
illustrated in Figure 20 below. This shows an erratic pattern both before and after BPCI. The 
mathematical trend lines are slightly downward, however, the trend line equation and model had 
a p-value of 0.7330 which indicates that this is not a statistically significant trend. This was 
validated with the Chi-Square test statistic. At a confidence level of 95% and α = 0.05, the p-
value was found to be 0.360, indicating that the decrease in the proportion of deep vein 
thrombosis/pulmonary embolism from 0.80% before BPCI to 0.38% after BPCI was not 
statistically significant. 
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Figure 20. Trend of rate of deep vein thrombosis/pulmonary embolism before and after BPCI. 
Pre-Operative Education. The rate of pre-operative education for each month over the 36-
month study timeframe is illustrated in Figure 21 below. This shows that no pre-operative 
education was given before BPCI, which was expected because it was a new and key feature of 
the BPCI treatment. This is followed by a sharp increase and then some variation after BPCI. 
The overall trend was upward as indicated by the mathematical trend lines. The trend line 
equation and model had a p-value of 0.0345 which indicates that this is a statistically significant 
trend. This was validated with the Chi-Square test statistic. At a confidence level of 95% and α = 
0.05, the p-value was found to be <0.0001, indicating that the increase in the proportion of pre-
operative education from 0% before BPCI to 71.2% after BPCI was statistically significant. 
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Figure 21. Trend of rate of pre-operative education before and after BPCI. 
Discharge Patterns. The discharge patterns before and after BPCI are compared and 
illustrated in Figure 22 below. This shows discharges to home increased from 5.8% to 8.4%, 
discharges to home health increased from 37.0% to 41.1%, discharges to skilled nursing facilities 
decreased from 53.9% to 47.8%, and other types of discharges decreased from 3% to 2%. 
However, Chi-Square test statistics showed that at a confidence level of 95% and α = 0.05, only 
the changes in the skilled nursing facility discharges and other discharges were statistically 
significant with p-values 0.041 and 0.009, respectively. The latter category (Other) included 
discharges to short-term and intermediate-term care facilities, inpatient rehabilitation centers, and 
patients who expired during the episode timeframe. 
 
 83 
 
Figure 22. Discharge patterns before and after BPCI. 
Summary 
This chapter presented summary and detailed results from the BPCI study experiment 
timeframe as experienced by the hospital. Financial outcomes were not statistically significant, 
despite increasing during the study. Operational outcomes were statistically significant and 
showed a decrease in length of stay. The clinical outcome, 30-day readmissions, did not 
statistically change even though the raw numbers indicate a slight increase. These and the other 
notable observations presented in this chapter are discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Introduction 
This final chapter presents a discussion of the findings of this study and their meaning 
and significance. It begins with an overview of the research problem, the purpose of the study, 
the research questions, and how the study was designed and carried out. Next, the results are 
summarized briefly, followed by a more in-depth discussion and interpretation of the findings. It 
also discusses practical implications, study limitations, and potential future research. The chapter 
ends with some concluding remarks. 
Research Study Overview 
Healthcare costs per capita in the U.S. are higher than any other industrialized nation and 
they continue to climb. By 2025, these expenditures could reach over $5 trillion annually which 
is nearly one-fifth of the economy (CMS, 2016b). Furthermore coordinated, safe and high quality 
care is not afforded with consistency or to all Americans. Both of these problems are on soaring 
trajectories as the population ages and the demand for health services increases. The U.S. 
government currently bears more than 45 percent of the national healthcare costs and that share 
is also on an escalating path so it is motivated to swiftly address these problems. The Affordable 
Care Act of 2010 included a provision for CMS to develop innovative ways to reduce the costs 
of the healthcare industry while also improving the quality of care delivery. One of those ideas 
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was the Medicare BPCI Initiative – a reimbursement model launched as an experiment in 2013 
that paid hospitals a target amount for an entire episode of care, rather than piecemeal. 
This research study sought to determine the efficacy of BPCI as implemented at a large 
community hospital in the southeastern part of the United States in 2015 and 2016. That was to 
be accomplished by measuring whether certain financial, operational and clinical outcomes 
improved as result of the BPCI participation. The study design was a retrospective analysis of 
clinical and financial data for joint replacement patients enrolled in BPCI as compared to a 
similar patient population before the program started. 
Summary of Results 
Three quantitative research questions, framed as hypotheses, were addressed as well as 
one qualitative research question. The first research question was whether the hospital’s 
participation in BPCI led to better financial outcomes. The study hypothesized that the hospital 
charges for the episode of care would be lower for BPCI patients. The data analysis indicated no 
statistically significant change in hospital charges, despite the data showing a slight increase. 
Also noteworthy was that the CMS allowed payments and the target payments both trended 
downward during the study, however, the target was consistently lower than the allowed (actual), 
indicating that the hospital was unable to achieve the financial outcome goals planned with CMS 
during the study period of time. These same results (no significant change in financial outcomes) 
were observed when looking only at knee replacement patients, hip replacement patients, and 
patients with and without complications and comorbidities. 
The second research question was whether the hospital’s participation in BPCI led to 
better operational outcomes. The study hypothesized that the hospital length of stay would be 
shorter for BPCI patients. The data supported this. It indicated a statistically significant decrease 
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in hospital length of stay from 3.98 days to 3.64 days (8.5%). These same results (a significant 
change in operational outcomes) were observed when looking only at knee replacement patients 
and patients without complications and comorbidities. However, there was no significant change 
for hip replacement patients, and patients with complications and comorbidities. 
The third research question was whether the hospital’s participation in BPCI led to better 
clinical outcomes. The study hypothesized that the 30-day readmissions would be lower for 
BPCI patients. The data indicated a slight increase of less than 0.2% however, this was 
statistically not significant. These same results (no significant change in clinical outcomes) were 
observed when looking only at knee replacement patients, hip replacement patients, and patients 
with and without complications and comorbidities. 
The fourth research question was whether there were factors or characteristics that shaped 
the hospital’s participation in the BPCI program. The study hypothesized that a set of factors 
would define the program and lead to success. The analysis showed that there were six process 
steps undertaken to prepare for, implement, and operationalize the BPCI program, however they 
led to mixed results. These were leadership, program design, analytics design, care redesign, 
provider partnerships, and program compliance.  
There were several other findings in the data analysis. The rate of surgical site infections 
statistically decreased for BPCI patients from slightly less than 1% to zero. The rate of deep vein 
thrombosis/pulmonary embolism did not statistically change. The rate of pre-operative education 
was statistically significant as it went from zero to 71% of patients. Discharge patterns also 
showed some statistically significant changes with skilled nursing facilities receiving less post-
acute patients (54% before to 48% after BPCI). 
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Interpretation of the Findings 
Research Question 1 
The financial outcome results were not statistically significant, however the data showed 
a slight increase. One of the most important drivers of the BPCI program was to control 
healthcare costs through intentional care delivery redesign. Even though the data variable 
studied, hospital charges, does not fully reflect the overall episode costs, it was used as a proxy 
to determine the hospital’s readiness and capacity to contain, if not reduce, the cost of care for a 
targeted population of patients during a defined experiment. The expectation was that because 
this was a voluntary project with focused attention by leadership and the teams, that costs could 
be controlled, at least in the context of the experiment. Considerable educational efforts, program 
design, leadership oversight, and near real-time data analytics were established, however, 
reducing hospital charges still proved to be challenging. 
This may be indicative of a number of complicating factors coming together that are 
more fully discussed later in this chapter. Some of these include the short amount of time allotted 
to design and implement program changes before starting the experiment, the brief program 
duration of this study, and not having the time to complete the education program for all of the 
stakeholders prior to launch. Furthermore, there may have been other influential factors such as 
personnel changes that caused breaks in the program continuity, not enough focus on internal 
cost control of surgery supplies and implantables, and patient complexity and case mix. The 
latter was supported by the regression analysis performed that showed significant variation in 
hospital charges based on patient characteristics (age and complications) and also by surgeon. It 
suggests further study to determine if certain surgeons had a more complex patient case mix or if 
there is simply more opportunity to control costs. 
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Research Question 2 
The operational outcome results were statistically significant, and in the expected and 
desired direction. In addition, this result was also economically significant to the hospital 
financial operations. A reduction of hospital length of stay of 0.34 days across the brief 18-
month study with a small percentage of patients to measure was a welcome result, as every 
improvement in this metric generally translates to substantial hospital savings. While reducing 
hospital length of stay was an intentional objective of the BPCI program and part of the 
educational program for clinicians and patients, it is worthy to note that there were prior and 
ongoing efforts in the healthcare industry and in the study hospital to reduce length of stay. For a 
number of years, this hospital has been focused on this as an organization-wide goal and had 
been making steady progress – reducing from a patient population average of over 5 days to a 
mid to high 4-day range. That said, the BPCI patient group ended this study with an average of 
3.68 days, down from 3.98 days – a remarkable improvement in any case. 
Some studies found in the literature and presented in Chapter Two suggest that reducing 
length of stay might be offset by increasing readmissions. Although this study did not find a 
statistical change in readmissions, the trend was on a slight increase for the duration of the study, 
notwithstanding a short 18 months. It would be a pattern to watch very closely. One other 
interesting notion is that the shorter length of stay could have been influenced by the fact that the 
program was designed with considerably more follow-up care protocols and proactive post-
discharge case management. Perhaps that gave physicians and patients greater comfort to 
discharge sooner, knowing that any complications would likely be detected quickly in the post-
acute setting. 
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Research Question 3 
The clinical outcome results were not statistically different from before the BPCI 
program. While the expectation was to decrease 30-day readmissions through education, follow-
up care protocols and aligning goals with post-acute care providers, this study found the rate to 
be statistically flat. In addition to driving down healthcare costs, another important BPCI 
program objective was to improve clinical quality of care. CMS uses a variety of measures to 
assess this, however this study examined 30-day readmissions to the hospital. Other measures 
include visits to the emergency department, mortality rates, and hospital-acquired infection rates. 
Readmissions rates, as indicated in some studies found in the literature, have a close 
relationship to patient demographics, case complexity (such as broken bones in the case of 
orthopedic procedures), prior complications and comorbidities, provider risk tolerances for 
treating conditions outside the hospital setting, and post-acute care facilities practice patterns and 
alignment with hospital and physician goals and objectives. It would be worthwhile to study 
some of these additional variables together with readmissions rates to see the full picture. Also, 
given that there were many post-acute care facilities working with the hospital during this study, 
it is conceivable that there was not enough time before and during the study timeframe to fully 
educate and align these providers with the hospital BPCI objectives or develop motivational 
incentives for them. 
Research Question 4 
The BPCI program was built on the principle that care delivery must be redesigned in 
order to effect the changes desired in financial, operational and clinical outcomes. While no 
template or method existed to achieve that, the study hospital took the task of designing the 
program seriously and started months before the launch. The quantitative results of the first 18 
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months were mixed and even somewhat discouraging. It is important to look carefully at the 
program design elements to discover how they contributed to the results – both expected and 
unexpected. 
The hospital’s program status reports indicated that review, redesign and improvement 
efforts were and are continuous and ongoing. They also highlighted that this program had 
executive leadership firmly established with the BPCI vision communicated, as well as a multi-
disciplinary team of leaders and staff who built, implemented and oversaw the program. This 
first step was noted as a critical success factor in numerous published articles about BPCI. The 
second and third steps undertaken to design the program methods, processes, and supporting 
information systems, and to architect the analytics tools and processes also appeared to be robust 
and functioning well. 
The real challenges were in the care redesign interventions and the provider partnerships. 
These steps were large in scope and complexity. They took time and staff, and presented steep 
learning curves for a hospital without any prior experience in this type of program or payment 
system. Something as simple-sounding as educating staff and physicians on how the BPCI 
worked was daunting when considering the time it takes away from the already busy hospital 
operations, the turnover in personnel, and human nature to resist change. Effectively educating 
patients was also a struggle with the older population (Medicare patients are mostly 65 and 
older). Social norms and beliefs about an individual’s role in the management of their own health 
and care, as well as poor health literacy, add to the difficulty in persuading patients to adopt a 
new collaborative and engaged mindset. 
Finally, developing partnerships and creating alignment in objectives with providers 
across the continuum of care presented another steep hill to climb in a short timeframe. For 
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hospitals such as the study site who do not own or control post-acute care facilities and have no 
means to financially incentivize them, it takes considerable time and effort to effect practice and 
behavioral changes that supported BPCI. Some studies point out that it is most effective to limit 
these partnerships to just a small number and focus on the relationships and results. 
Discussion about the Research 
Four themes emerged over the course of this research study gleaned from the literature 
and lessons learned: 1.) be wary of declarations of success that might be premature, 2.) 
implementing a program like this is a monumental project, 3.) building relationships that have 
aligned goals and rewards are key, and 4.) the effective and efficient delivery of healthcare is a 
very complicated undertaking. These four themes are described more fully in the following 
sections. 
Do Not Call Victory Too Soon 
Even though bundled payments and other alternative payment models have been around 
for decades, none have been as widely implemented as BPCI. BPCI, however, was only launched 
four years ago, and at the time of this study, CMS had only released evaluation data, information 
and reports covering the first five quarters. While there are some significant and positive 
financial, operational and clinical outcomes so far, there are also reported challenges and pockets 
of the experiment where results failed to meet targets and goals. Much of the published literature 
also discussed similar findings, and this particular study certainly is also an attestation of the 
axiom, do not call victory too soon. More time, more provider participants, and more patients in 
this and other bundled payment programs are needed to validate results and especially processes 
and procedures. Despite this, CMS has continued on with bundled payments, implementing new 
episode payment model programs in the last two years, voluntary and mandatory. 
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It is Not a Flip of a Switch 
Implementing an alternative payment model such as BPCI is an enormous undertaking, 
and probably especially so for certain types of hospitals. Characteristics such as profit status, 
financial health, capacity and agility to implement a project of this magnitude, community socio-
economics, patient demographics, and the list goes on. Far from being a flip of a switch, this 
requires a cultural change in an organization and its provider partners in the continuum of care. It 
requires a new mindset of clinical and financial integration, and a collective, coordinated and 
longitudinal focus on patients care plans. It also requires a hefty investment of time and 
resources, with potentially new staff roles (patient navigators, care coordinators, and clinicians 
rounding on external post-acute facilities) and new service offerings (patient and family 
education, follow-up patient interaction, and telehealth). 
Relationships are the Magic 
Relationships and collaboration among care providers and with patients are key design 
elements in the BPCI model. There are a host of stakeholders involved in implementing bundled 
payments effectively, and various complex relationships involving hospitals, physicians, 
patients, payers, and post-acute care providers, and each is motivated differently. For a bundled 
episode of care to be successful, all of the providers along the care chain have to be synchronized 
about the goals and objectives. Each provider likely has their own historical practice patterns and 
each is motivated by unique factors. Incentives, risks, and penalties have to be set at the right 
levels to create alignment. For instance, upside incentives and/or downside risks that are too low 
are not effective. Finally communication, transparency and near real time feedback foster these 
relationships significantly. 
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Healthcare is Greatly Complicated 
Reengineering a healthcare delivery system is not at all akin to process improvements in 
a manufacturing system of inanimate objects. Variation in human subjects is a natural hazard in 
healthcare. This study and other prior research showed that there are potentially numerous 
factors that confound the results. First and foremost, healthcare is an industry that has been 
undergoing reform for many years, and many hospitals and providers have long been working 
diligently on improving care delivery, reducing costs, and improving quality and safety. As such 
it is difficult to look at outcomes for a program like BPCI in isolation of all the other initiatives 
ongoing and attribute certain results to specific programs. As an example, population health 
initiatives are particularly widespread and they require aspects of care redesign that are very 
similar to bundled payments. Second, healthcare is far from a predictable business – hospitals 
cannot accurately forecast patients demographics, complexity, volume, case mix, and sometimes 
even government and regulatory changes. Finally, there are a myriad of business units, 
individuals, government entities, and corporate structures all working in a complex maze of 
clinical and financial laws and rules in one of the most regulated industries. It is complicated. 
Practical Implications 
This study’s quantitative and qualitative analysis have optimistically extended the body 
of knowledge about the efficacy of alternative payment models in a large community hospital 
that might also be generalizable to other hospitals across the country. In particular, this study 
revealed significant challenges in implementing such programs and presented lessons learned. It 
also demonstrated that while desired outcomes are possible, it might take considerably more 
time, effort and program adjustments along the way to achieve them. 
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For the executive leaders in healthcare delivery, this study shows that replacing the 
traditional fee-for-service paradigm in the healthcare industry with bundled payments could reap 
benefits for all of the participants in the healthcare value chain if implemented well: patients, 
providers, and payors, alike. At the same time, it might contribute to solving the most vexing 
problems of the U.S. healthcare system: the soaring costs and lack of consistent quality care. The 
implementation models and care redesign programs discussed in the literature review chapter, as 
well as the six-point program design at the study hospital all have potentially valuable tips for 
future hospitals to ease the transition to bundled payments. The many factors, variables and 
challenges discussed that could possibly impact outcomes might also be useful for hospitals 
embarking on a bundled payment program. 
For government entities and others working on innovative solutions to our healthcare 
problems, this study adds one more empirical look at evidence supporting mixed results to those 
already documented in published studies. The Lewin report (2016) indicated that there are not 
enough current and past participants in the BPCI program yet to determine the true efficacy. This 
study helps that cause and adds to the body of knowledge about the requirements and design 
standards for bundled payment program implementations. Perhaps the lessons learned from this 
hospital’s experiences, coupled with other empirical studies, might lead to the development of a 
model that depicts at least some of the factors that are important in the implementation of a 
bundled payment initiative, as well as the characteristics of the environment that may impact the 
success of the program. 
For academic scholars, this study hopefully sparks interest in continued research on this 
topic. Some ideas for future work in this field are discussed in the following sections. 
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Limitations 
This research was designed as a retrospective analysis of data for a single hospital during 
a short timeframe with a small number of patients. The study was constrained by time, data and 
access that if not limited, could have yielded much richer results and discussion. The timeframe 
was necessarily short because the BPCI program was fairly new and the study hospital had just 
begun participating. The data was also limited because the hospital did not have access to post-
acute information or timely CMS data. In a more ideal design, a study such as this would include 
data from multiple hospitals over a longer period of time, with a larger population of patients in 
both control and treatment groups. With that additional scope, the study results might be more 
generalizable. This study was also intentionally limited to investigating only certain factors that 
may have impacted the results, such as hospital costs, length of stay and readmissions. It was not 
feasible to consider other factors, such as patient, surgeon and post-acute facility profiles as well 
as longitudinal program changes, due to data availability and research time allotted. 
Future Research 
This research study might set a foundation for future research in this focus area. In the 
quantitative realm, there are many more studies that could be done to determine whether bundled 
payment outcomes improve costs and quality of care. As examples, analysis could be done for 
other clinical episodes, for acute care bundles versus chronic care bundles, for different 
organization types (profit versus non-profit, single hospitals versus multi-hospital systems, 
accountable care organizations, physician groups versus hospitals, systems with ownership in 
multiple venues of care), for different patient demographics and complexity; for different 
incentive models, and for additional payors such as commercial insurance companies. There are 
also interesting qualitative studies that could be undertaken, such as case studies with physicians 
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and post-acute care providers to determine what motivators and incentives would support 
bundled payment programs. Research in this area could include a study applying some aspects of 
Nudge theory, which suggests that a softer approach to achieving compliance than gainsharing 
agreements could include positive reinforcement and indirect suggestions. Finally, focus groups 
or surveys with patients and hospital staff might reveal how these programs impact them. 
Conclusion 
The results from this study and others on BPCI could provide valuable insight to those 
engaged in healthcare delivery and payment innovation. It may influence future program design 
and enable participants to achieve greater success that is essential to improving the quality and 
efficiency of our care delivery system. The lessons learned from the research and published 
literature could help inform healthcare transformation efforts particularly related to hospitals 
effectively engaging with physicians and other providers to lower costs and improve care.  
There are a plethora of significant challenges facing healthcare, not least skyrocketing 
costs, an aging population with increasing chronic diseases, little coordination of care among 
providers, not enough patient activation and engagement, and a lack of alignment in goals, 
objectives and economics between providers, payors, patients, and employers. Only with 
continued research on bundled payments and other versions of alternative payment programs will 
we know whether this type of model is viable for the future and will begin to solve the heavy 
healthcare cost and quality problems our country faces. Eventually, a payment system coupled 
with a care delivery model will emerge that captures the best of all of the ideas and experimental 
programs. This iterative process should continue to be informed by research and studies such as 
this one as we collectively work toward the goals of better healthcare, controlled spending, and 
healthy people.  
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Appendix A: Summary of Affordable Care Act 
 
Table 19. Summary of ACA compiled by author. Title III highlighted as the topic of this research 
study. (Source: McDonough, 2011) 
THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
PUBLIC LAW 111–148 ENACTED MARCH 23, 2010 
TITLE I 
QUALITY, AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE FOR ALL AMERICANS 
This title makes various reforms to the nature and operation of private health insurance and 
details the requirements of Health Insurance Exchanges 
TITLE II 
ROLE OF PUBLIC PROGRAMS 
This title creates substantial changes to Medicaid and contains most of the provisions 
relating to the Children’s Health Insurance Program 
TITLE III 
IMPROVING THE QUALITY AND EFFICIENCY OF HEALTH CARE 
This title will protect and preserve Medicare and establishes new mechanisms to improve 
the quality of medical care by making it more efficient and effective, and patient-centered. 
 
Subtitle A -Transforming The Health Care Delivery System 
Part III - Encouraging Development Of New Patient Care Models 
Sec. 3023 - National Pilot Program On Payment Bundling: 
 
Directs CMS to develop a national, voluntary pilot program encouraging hospitals, 
physicians and post-acute care providers to improve patient care and achieve cost savings 
for the Medicare program through bundled payment reimbursement models. The program is 
to be established by January 1, 2013 for a period of five years. Before January 1, 2016, 
CMS is also required to submit a plan to Congress to expand the pilot program if doing so 
will improve patient care and reduce spending. 
TITLE IV 
PREVENTION OF CHRONIC DISEASE AND IMPROVING PUBLIC HEALTH 
This title has provisions that promote healthier lifestyles for all Americans and to prevent 
disease and disability 
TITLE V 
HEALTH CARE WORKFORCE 
This title establishes a National Healthcare Workforce Commission to analyze and plan for 
the healthcare workforce needs 
TITLE VI 
TRANSPARENCY AND PROGRAM INTEGRITY 
This title provides new authority to federal and state agencies to combat fraud and abuse in 
Medicare, Medicaid, and private health insurance 
TITLE VII 
IMPROVING ACCESS TO INNOVATIVE MEDICAL THERAPIES 
This title directs a regulatory pathway for the development, manufacture, marketing, and 
sale of bio-similar generic-like versions of biopharmaceutical drugs 
TITLE VIII 
COMMUNITY LIVING ASSISTANCE SUPPORTS AND SERVICES 
This title authorizes a new national and voluntary long-term disability insurance program to 
provide workers support if they become permanently and temporarily disabled 
TITLE IX 
REVENUE PROVISIONS 
This title has provisions to cover the financing for slightly less than half the cost of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
TITLE X 
STRENGTHENING QUALITY, AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE FOR ALL AMERICANS 
This title includes amendments and additions to Titles I-IX and also reauthorizes the Indian 
Health Care Improvement Act for American Indians and Alaskan Natives 
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Appendix B: Summary of BPCI Initiative 
 
Figure 23. Summary illustration of BPCI program. (Source: Caradigm, 2016) 
Table 20. Summary of BPCI program compiled by author. Model 2 highlighted as the topic of 
this research study. (Source: CMS, 2016) 
BPCI Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Participants Hospital Hospital, health system, physician group 
Skilled nursing, inpatient 
rehabilitation, long-term 
care, home health, 
physician group 
Hospital, health system 
Episodes All diagnoses; all acute patients, hospital only 
Selected diagnoses; 
hospital plus post-acute 
period 
Selected diagnoses; 
post-acute period only 
Selected diagnoses; 
hospital plus 
readmissions 
Services included in 
the bundle 
All Medicare Part A 
services paid as part of 
the MS-DRG payment 
All non-hospice 
Medicare Part A and B 
services during the 
initial inpatient stay, 
post-acute period and 
readmissions 
All non-hospice Medicare 
Part A and B services 
during the post-acute 
period and readmissions 
All non-hospice Medicare 
Part A and B services 
(including the hospital 
and physician) during 
initial inpatient stay and 
readmissions 
Payment Retrospective discounted payment 
Traditional fee for 
service; retrospective 
reconciliation with target 
price that includes 2-3% 
discount 
Traditional fee for 
service; retrospective 
reconciliation with target 
price that includes 3% 
discount 
Single prospective 
predetermined bundled 
payment 
Program Dates April 2013 – December 2016 
October 2013 – 
September 2018 
October 2013 – 
September 2018 
October 2013 – 
September 2018 
Number of Participants 
as of April 1, 2016 1 649 862 10 
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Appendix C: Glossary of Acronyms Related to this Study 
Abbreviation Meaning 
ACA Affordable Care Act 
BPCI Bundled Payments for Care Improvement 
CJR Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement 
CMMI Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation 
CMS Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
DRG Diagnosis-Related Group 
EPM Episode Payment Model 
FFS Fee for Service 
IDS Integrated delivery system 
IRF Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility 
LEJR Lower Extremity Joint Replacement 
LOS Length of Stay 
P4P Pay for Performance 
PAC Post-Acute Care 
SNF Skilled Nursing Facility 
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Appendix D: Glossary of Terms Related to this Study 
Term Definition in the context of this study 
BPCI Beneficiary A patient scheduled or admitted for the applicable clinical episode (LEJR 
in this study) who is eligible for Medicare Part A and enrolled in Part B, 
does not have End Stage Renal Disease and is not enrolled in any 
managed care plan 
BPCI Bundled 
Payment 
A predetermined target price for all of the items and services provided for 
the episode of care. A retrospective reconciliation compares this target 
price to the total fee for service payments made by CMS to the providers. 
If the total fee for service payments is less than the target price, the 
hospital receives the difference from CMS. If the total fee for service 
payments exceeds the target price, the hospital must pay the difference to 
CMS 
BPCI Episode of 
Care 
The pre-admission test, patient’s hospital care, post-acute care, and all 
related services which ends 30 days after initial hospital discharge 
BPCI Outcomes – 
Clinical 
Assessed as the quality of care during an episode of care and measured in 
two components: readmissions to the hospital and visits to the emergency 
department during the 30 days following the initial hospital discharge. 
Clinical outcomes are considered better if the 30-day readmissions of an 
episode of care during the BPCI program is less than that of a similar 
episode of care not in the BPCI program 
BPCI Outcomes - 
Financial 
Assessed as the total cost of an episode of care and measured in two 
components: hospital care cost and post-acute care cost. Financial 
outcomes are considered better if the total cost of an episode of care 
during the BPCI program is less than that of a similar episode of care not 
in the BPCI program 
BPCI Outcomes - 
Operational 
Assessed as the utilization of services during an episode of care and 
measured in two components: patient length of stay in the hospital and 
patient length of stay in a post-acute care facility. Operational outcomes 
are considered better if the utilization of an episode of care during the 
BPCI program is less than that of a similar episode of care not in the 
BPCI program 
BPCI Post-Acute 
Care 
Services from providers of care from the date of hospital discharge until 
30 days after. This includes skilled nursing facilities, home health, 
inpatient and outpatient rehabilitation and follow-up services, hospital 
readmissions, and emergency care visits 
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Fee for Service The traditional way for hospitals and providers to be paid for care 
rendered where each service is charged separately and payment is 
received for each service 
Medicare A federal health insurance program for the elderly (people 65 years of age 
or older), certain individuals with disabilities, and people with End Stage 
Renal Disease. It is an entitlement program that differs from Medicaid, 
which is a federal and state welfare program for the poor. In addition to 
these federal programs, there are also commercial and private insurance 
programs. Medicare has four parts (A, B, C and D) that cover different 
services 
Medicare Part A Hospital insurance that covers inpatient hospital stays, care in a skilled 
nursing facility, hospice care, and some home healthcare 
Medicare Part B Medical insurance that covers certain doctors' services, outpatient care, 
medical supplies, and preventive services 
Medicare Part C A group of plans known as Medicare Advantage that are offered by 
private companies contracted with Medicare to provide Part A and Part B 
benefits 
Medicare Part D Prescription drug coverage offered by insurance companies and other 
private companies approved by Medicare 
Pay for 
Performance 
A more contemporary hospital and provider payment system that links 
payment to quality and efficiency as an incentive to improve care and 
decrease costs 
Payment System - 
Prospective 
A system where the payment for a specific service is predetermined and 
not based on actual costs incurred 
Payment System - 
Retrospective 
A system where the payment for a specific service is based on actual costs 
incurred 
Provider Charge The amount that the hospital or provider bills the insurance payor for a 
service and this may not be equal to the cost of the service 
Provider Cost The actual amount that the hospital or provider actually incurs to provide 
a service 
Provider 
Reimbursement 
The amount an insurance payor, such as Medicare, actually pays the 
hospital or provider for a service and it may not be the same as the costs 
incurred or the charges billed 
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Appendix E: USF Institutional Review Board Approval 
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Appendix F: Hospital Institutional Review Board Approval (Redacted) 
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Appendix G: Statistics Supporting Summary Results  
Statistics Supporting Summary of Descriptive Variables 
 
Summary Statistics for 3 Descriptive Variables: Age, Knee/Hip, and DRG. This output was 
generated by IBM SPSS Statistics using the MEANS Procedure. 
 
 
Report 
BP_FLAG AGE_CODE KNEE_FLAG DRG470_FLAG 
0 Mean 75.46 .53 .94 
Std. Deviation 8.665 .500 .234 
Minimum 47 0 0 
Maximum 98 1 1 
N 622 622 622 
1 Mean 75.31 .53 .94 
Std. Deviation 8.146 .499 .246 
Minimum 45 0 0 
Maximum 101 1 1 
N 525 525 525 
Total Mean 75.39 .53 .94 
Std. Deviation 8.428 .499 .239 
Minimum 45 0 0 
Maximum 101 1 1 
N 1147 1147 1147 
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Statistics Supporting Summary of Dependent Variables 
 
Summary Statistics for 3 Dependent Variables: HOSP_CHRG, HOSP_LOS, and 
READMIT_FLAG. This output was generated by IBM SPSS Statistics using the MEANS 
Procedure. 
 
 
Report 
BP_FLAG HOSP_CHRG HOSP_LOS READMIT_FLAG 
0 Mean 72452.63329000000000 3.98 .08 
Std. Deviation 19960.793609999997000 1.804 .272 
Median 69156.30936000000000 3.00 .00 
Minimum 30306.422430000000 1 0 
Maximum 308477.349600000000 20 1 
N 622 622 622 
% of Total N 54.2% 54.2% 54.2% 
1 Mean 73571.63023000000000 3.64 .08 
Std. Deviation 20038.067890000000000 1.943 .274 
Median 70798.87245000000000 3.00 .00 
Minimum 35140.236480000000 1 0 
Maximum 257373.000000000000 21 1 
N 525 525 525 
% of Total N 45.8% 45.8% 45.8% 
Total Mean 72964.81585000000000 3.83 .08 
Std. Deviation 19995.248509999998000 1.876 .273 
Median 69656.63629000000000 3.00 .00 
Minimum 30306.422430000000 1 0 
Maximum 308477.349600000000 21 1 
N 1147 1147 1147 
% of Total N 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Statistics Supporting Summary of Other Variables 
 
Summary Statistics for Other Dependent Variables. This output was generated by IBM SPSS 
Statistics using the MEANS Procedure. 
 
Report 
BP_FLAG SSI_FLAG DVTPE_FLAG PREOP_ED_FLAG 
0 Mean .0096 .0080 .0000 
N 622 622 622 
% of Total N 54.2% 54.2% 54.2% 
1 Mean .0000 .0038 .7124 
N 525 525 525 
% of Total N 45.8% 45.8% 45.8% 
Total Mean .0052 .0061 .3261 
N 1147 1147 1147 
% of Total N 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Report 
BP_FLAG 
DCHOME_ 
FLAG 
DCHH_ 
FLAG 
DCSNF_ 
FLAG 
DCIRF_ 
FLAG 
DCEXP_ 
FLAG 
DCOTHER_ 
FLAG 
0 Mean .0579 .3698 .5386 .0161 .0048 .0129 
N 622 622 622 622 622 622 
% of Total N 54.2% 54.2% 54.2% 54.2% 54.2% 54.2% 
1 Mean .0838 .4114 .4781 .0229 .0038 .0000 
N 525 525 525 525 525 525 
% of Total N 45.8% 45.8% 45.8% 45.8% 45.8% 45.8% 
Total Mean .0697 .3888 .5109 .0192 .0044 .0070 
N 1147 1147 1147 1147 1147 1147 
% of Total N 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Appendix H. Statistics Supporting Research Question 1 Results 
 
Statistics Supporting Hospital Charges Trend Graph 
 
Trend of Mean Hospital Charges Before and After BPCI. This output was generated by Tableau 
Desktop Professional. 
 
Trend Line Equation  
 
P-value: 0.0707607 
Equation: Avg. HOSP_CHRG = 3.17888*Month of Admit Date + -60988.3 
 
Coefficients  
Term Value StdErr t-value p-value 
ADMIT_MONTH 3.17888 1.70404 1.86549 0.0707607 
Intercept -60988.3 71864.5 -0.848657 0.402008 
 
Trend Lines Model 
 
A linear trend model is computed for average of HOSP_CHRG given ADMIT_MONTH.  
 
Model formula: (ADMIT_MONTH + intercept) 
Number of modeled observations: 36 
Number of filtered observations: 0 
Model degrees of freedom: 2 
Residual degrees of freedom (DF): 34 
SSE (sum squared error): 3.55648e+08 
MSE (mean squared error): 1.04602e+07 
R-Squared: 0.092851 
Standard error: 3234.23 
p-value (significance): 0.0707607 
 
Individual Trend Lines 
 
Panes Line Coefficients 
Row Column p-value DF Term Value StdErr t-value p-value 
HOSP_CHRG ADMIT_MONTH 0.0707607 34 ADMIT_MONTH 3.17888 1.70404 1.86549 0.0707607 
 intercept -60988.3 71864.5 -0.848657 0.402008 
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Statistics Supporting Hospital Charges Assumptions Tests 
 
Assumptions Test of Normality and Test of Homogeneity of Variance for Dependent Variable 
Hospital Charges. This output was generated by IBM SPSS Statistics using the EXPLORE 
Procedure. 
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Histograms illustrating departures from normality. 
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Statistics Supporting Hospital Charges Hypothesis Test 
 
Hypothesis Test for Dependent Variable Hospital Charges. This output was generated by IBM 
SPSS Statistics using the T-Test Procedure and the Nonparametric Test Procedure. 
 
 
T-Test 
 
 
 
 
Nonparametric Test 
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Statistics Supporting CMS Payment Trend Graphs 
 
Summary Statistics for CMS Payment Variables. This output was generated by IBM SPSS 
Statistics using the MEANS Procedure. 
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Statistics Supporting Hospital Charges Tests for KNEE ONLY 
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Statistics Supporting Hospital Charges Tests for HIP ONLY 
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Statistics Supporting Hospital Charges Tests for DRG 470 ONLY 
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Statistics Supporting Hospital Charges Tests for DRG 469 ONLY 
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Appendix I: Statistics Supporting Research Question 2 Results 
 
Statistics Supporting Hospital Length of Stay Trend Graph 
 
Trend of Mean Hospital Length of Stay Before and After BPCI. This output was generated by 
Tableau Desktop Professional. 
 
Trend Line Equation  
 
P-value: 0.0058659 
Equation: Avg. HOSP_LOS = -0.000511543*ADMIT_MONTH + 25.398 
 
Coefficients  
Term Value StdErr t-value p-value 
ADMIT_MONTH -0.0005115 0.000174 -2.93995 0.0058659 
Intercept 25.398 7.33798 3.46117 0.0014694 
 
Trend Lines Model 
 
A linear trend model is computed for average of HOSP_LOS given ADMIT_MONTH.  
The model may be significant at p <= 0.05. 
 
Model formula: (ADMIT_MONTH + intercept) 
Number of modeled observations: 36 
Number of filtered observations: 0 
Model degrees of freedom: 2 
Residual degrees of freedom (DF): 34 
SSE (sum squared error): 3.70804 
MSE (mean squared error): 0.10906 
R-Squared: 0.202688 
Standard error: 0.330242 
p-value (significance): 0.0058659 
 
Individual Trend Lines 
 
Panes Line Coefficients 
Row Column p-value DF Term Value StdErr t-value p-value 
HOPS_LOS ADMIT_MONTH 0.0058659 34 ADMIT_MONTH -0.0005115 0.000174 -2.93995 0.0058659 
 intercept 25.398 7.33798 3.46117 0.0014694 
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Statistics Supporting Hospital Length of Stay Assumptions Tests 
 
Assumptions Test of Normality and Test of Homogeneity of Variance for Dependent Variable 
Hospital Length of Stay. This output was generated by IBM SPSS Statistics using the EXPLORE 
Procedure. 
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Histograms illustrating departures from normality. 
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Statistics Supporting Hospital Length of Stay Hypothesis Test 
 
Hypothesis Test for Dependent Variable Hospital Length of Stay. This output was generated by 
IBM SPSS Statistics using the T-Test Procedure and the Nonparametric Test Procedure. 
 
 
T-Test 
 
 
 
 
Nonparametric Test 
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Statistics Supporting Hospital Length of Stay Tests for KNEE ONLY 
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Statistics Supporting Hospital Length of Stay Tests for HIP ONLY 
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Statistics Supporting Hospital Length of Stay Tests for DRG 470 ONLY 
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Statistics Supporting Hospital Length of Stay Tests for DRG 469 ONLY 
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Appendix J: Statistics Supporting Research Question 3 Results 
 
Statistics Supporting 30-Day Readmissions Trend Graph 
 
Trend of Rate of 30-Day Readmissions Before and After BPCI. This output was generated by 
Tableau Desktop Professional. 
 
Trend Line Equation  
 
P-value: 0.606483 
Equation: Avg. READMIT_FLAG = -1.43513e-05*ADMIT_MONTH + 0.687056 
 
Coefficients  
Term Value StdErr t-value p-value 
ADMIT_MONTH -1.435e-05 2.76e-05 -0.519928 0.606483 
intercept 0.687056 1.16408 0.590214 0.55895 
 
Trend Lines Model 
 
A linear trend model is computed for average of Readmit given ADMIT_MONTH. 
 
Model formula: (ADMIT_MONTH + intercept ) 
Number of modeled observations: 36 
Number of filtered observations: 0 
Model degrees of freedom: 2 
Residual degrees of freedom (DF): 34 
SSE (sum squared error): 0.0933158 
MSE (mean squared error): 0.0027446 
R-Squared: 0.007888 
Standard error: 0.0523888 
p-value (significance): 0.606483 
 
Individual Trend Lines 
 
Panes Line Coefficients 
Row Column p-value DF Term Value StdErr t-value p-value 
READMIT_FLAG ADMIT_MONTH 0.606483 34 ADMIT_MONTH -1.435e-05 2.76e-05 -0.519928 0.606483 
 intercept 0.687056 1.16408 0.590214 0.55895 
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Statistics Supporting 30-Day Readmissions Hypothesis Test 
 
Comparison of Proportions for Dependent Variable 30-Day Readmissions. This output was 
generated by IBM SPSS Statistics using the CROSSTAB Procedure. 
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Statistics Supporting 30-day Readmissions Tests for KNEE ONLY 
 
 
 
Statistics Supporting 30-day Readmissions Tests for HIP ONLY 
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Statistics Supporting 30-day Readmissions Tests for DRG 470 ONLY 
 
 
Statistics Supporting 30-day Readmissions Tests for DRG 469 ONLY 
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Appendix K: Statistics Supporting Other Results 
Statistics Supporting Surgical Site Infections Trend Graph 
 
Trend of Rate of Surgical Site Infections Before and After BPCI. This output was generated by 
Tableau Desktop Professional. 
 
Trend Line Equation  
 
P-value: 0.0479148 
Equation: Avg. SSI_FLAG = -1.14648e-05*ADMIT_MONTH + 0.487752 
 
Coefficients  
Term Value StdErr t-value p-value 
ADMIT_MONTH -1.146e-05 5.587e-06 -2.05219 0.0479148 
intercept 0.487752 0.235604 2.07022 0.0460952 
 
Statistics Supporting Surgical Site Infections Comparison of Proportions 
 
Comparison of Proportions for Variable Surgical Site Infections. This output was generated by 
IBM SPSS Statistics using the CROSSTAB Procedure. 
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Statistics Supporting Deep Vein Thrombosis/Pulmonary Embolism Trend Graph 
 
Trend of Rate of Deep Vein Thrombosis/Pulmonary Embolism Before and After BPCI. This 
output was generated by Tableau Desktop Professional. 
 
Trend Line Equation  
 
P-value: 0.733029 
Equation: Avg. DVTPE_FLAG = -2.47717e-06*ADMIT_MONTH + 0.110151 
 
Coefficients  
Term Value StdErr t-value p-value 
ADMIT_MONTH -2.477e-06 7.203e-06 -0.343914 0.733029 
intercept 0.110151 0.303767 0.362617 0.719136 
 
Statistics Supporting Deep Vein Thrombosis/Pulm Embolism Comparison of Proportions 
 
Comparison of Proportions for Variable Deep Vein Thrombosis/Pulmonary Embolism. This 
output was generated by IBM SPSS Statistics using the CROSSTAB Procedure. 
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Statistics Supporting Pre-Operative Education Trend Graph 
 
Trend of Rate of Pre-Operative Education Before and After BPCI. This output was generated by 
Tableau Desktop Professional. 
 
Trend Line Equation  
 
P-value: 0.0345289 
Equation: Avg. PREOP_ED_FLAG = 0.000770911*ADMIT_MONTH + -32.014 
 
Coefficients  
Term Value StdErr t-value p-value 
ADMIT_MONTH 0.0007709 0.0003337 2.31044 0.0345289 
intercept -32.014 14.1627 -2.26043 0.0380888 
 
Statistics Supporting Pre-Operative Education Comparison of Proportions 
 
Comparison of Proportions for Variable Pre-Operative Education. This output was generated by 
IBM SPSS Statistics using the CROSSTAB Procedure. 
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Statistics Supporting Discharge Disposition Comparison of Proportions 
 
Comparison of Proportions for 6 Variables related to Discharge Disposition. This output was 
generated by IBM SPSS Statistics using the CROSSTAB Procedure. 
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Appendix L: Permission to use Figures from Peter G. Peterson Foundation 
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